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INTRODUCTION
The specter of terrorism within the United States has become
frighteningly real. The World Trade Center and Oklahoma City
bombings have effectively erased the traditional American paradigm
of terrorism as a foreign problem. These two incidents alone
caused staggering national losses. The World Trade Center bomb-
ing in February of 1993 killed six people and injured more than a
thousand others, created a crater 150-200 feet deep, and damaged
the massive complex five levels down and two levels up from the
explosion.' Economically, total damage was estimated at over $510
million,2 with claims in civil lawsuits filed totaling over $1.9 bil-
lion? And while the World Trade Center bombing was repeatedly
called "the single most destructive act of terrorism ever commit-
ted . . . in the United States,"4 a preliminary estimate from the
1. See Jeffrey S. Green & Ia Tripathi, Coping with Chaos: The World Trade Center
Bombing and Recovery Effort, 27 URn. LAW. 41, 41 (1995).
2. See Daniel Wise, Lawyers Pack World Trade Center Hearing, N.Y. LJ., May 9,
1994, at 1 (insurance industry estimate).
3. See Mitchell Pacelle, Onslaught of Civil Suits Begins in World Trade Center
Bombing, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1994, at B1, 110.
4. Ralph Blumenthal, Prosecutors Describe "Horror" as Trial in Towers Blast Opens,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1993, at 31.
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Oklahoma City bombing put damage at over $652 million.' When
considered with other recent terrorist attacks and threatened at-
tacks,6 these incidents suggest that domestic terrorism is an
emerging national problem. Americans must therefore develop
innovative solutions to address the issues of prevention and victim
compensation.
Initial responses to domestic terrorism have resulted in what
some have called the "hardening" of America.7 Government re-
sponses to domestic terrorism have included both modifications to
existing agencies' priorities as well as legislation providing for
limited victim compensation and expanded law enforcement pow-
ers.8 This Note considers the American common law response to
5. See Paul English, Preliminary Estimate Puts Bomb Losses at $652 Million: Uncov-
ered Costs To Stagger State Budget Resources, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 19, 1995,
at 1. Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating noted that the loss amount "not only makes it
the most catastrophic dollar loss in American history for a terrorist act, but in Oklahoma
it's without doubt the greatest loss to the public and private sectors ever." Id.
6. Including, for example, the Centennial Park bombing at the Olympics in Atlanta,
the Amtrak derailment in Arizona, Unabomber bombings and threats, and abortion clinic
attacks. "Scarcely a week goes by without at least one terrorist related incident making
the headlines." Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 119, 119. The director of the CIA recently told Congress that he
expects an increase in domestic terrorism over the next decade. See Sunday Today (NBC
television broadcast, Jan. 7, 1996).
7. See, e.g., Tom Masland et al., Fighting Back; Life in the Bull's-Eye, NEWSWEEK,
May 1, 1995, at 56. For example, security measures at the World Trade Center in the
aftermath of the bombing reflect both structural and procedural changes, including wrap-
ping columns with steel, painting windows with shatter-resistant coating, installing a hy-
draulic crash barrier, using an online photo ID system, restricting access to the towers,
hiring of hundreds of new security guards, moving outside parking away from the build-
ing, see id., and restricting parking in the underground garage where the bomb was deto-
nated. See Richard Lacayo, How Safe is Safe? Americans Must Decide How Much Free-
doa They Are Willing to Trade for More Security, TIME, May 1, 1995, at 68, 71. After
the Oklahoma City bombing, changes were implemented at Federal buildings around the
country. All in all, officials put more than 8,000 federal buildings on "second-level
alert"--requiring all employees and visitors to identify themselves "until further notice."
Masland et al., supra, at 56. And although he had opposed the action for some time,
President Clinton agreed to a ban of vehicular traffic in front of the White House. See
Kathy Lewis & G. Robert Hillman, White House Barriers Erected: Clinton Cites Terrorist
Fears, THE RECORD (Northern NJ.), May 21, 1995, at Al. In arguing for the measure,
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin said that "the bombings of the federal building in Okla-
homa City and the World Trade Center in New York are reminders of a growing terrorist
threat" Id. at A3.
8. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is best
known for its response to disasters like floods or earthquakes, has also begun to focus on
the problem of "technological events" like major acts of terrorism. See Scott S.
Greenberger, FEMA Focuses on Prevention, TELEGRAM & GAZErrE (Worcester, Mass.),
May 2, 1995, at Al, A2. After the World Trade Center bombing, FEMA came up with
recommendations to make structures safer, proposing designs for stronger windows and
doors. See id. at A3. In responding to the Oklahoma City bombing, in a more traditional
role, FEMA is expected to offset about $33 million of the loss, as well as provide for
rebuilding-loan programs. See English, supra note 5, at 1.
The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for
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domestic terrorism-landowner liability for terrorist acts-as typi-
fied by the civil litigation following in the wake of the World
Trade Center bombing.
After the World Trade Center bombing over 174 suits were
filed against the Port Authority, the owner of the World Trade
Center complex.' The suits involve "a relatively murky area of the
law,"'" namely a landowner's responsibility to protect tenants or
invitees against criminal acts of third parties. In brief, the courts
face the issue of whether the Port Authority, as landowner, was
negligent in either its assessment of the foreseeability of the harm
of a terrorist attack or the adequacy of the security measures it
took in response to that assessment.
An examination of this particular legal response to domestic
terrorist acts is critically important for several reasons. First, be-
yond the economic effects that can be imagined at the individual
party level, the placement of liability could also have significant
macroeconomic results." Further, imposing civil liability on land-
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred
at Oklahoma City, and Rescission Act, 1995, as its name implies, appropriates some $66
million for the demolition and rebuilding of the Federal building and authorizes an appro-
priation of Community Development Block Grant funds of approximately $39 million to
be used "to assist property and victims damaged and economic revitalization" in a speci-
fied area around the bombing site. Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2007(c), 109 Stat. 194, 252-53
(1995) [hereinafter Emergency Anti-Terrorism Act]. More controversial anti-terrorism provi-
sions of this Act include establishing a $34 million "Counterterrorism Fund" for the De-
partment of Justice, and appropriating $77 million for a "Domestic Counterterrorism Cen-
ter" for the FBI. See § 2007(c), 109 Stat. at 249-50.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, signed by President
Clinton in April of this year, authorizes $1 billion in law enforcement spending over four
years, provides for the designation of terrorist groups, bans fund raising in the U.S. for
designated terrorist groups, streamlines deportation procedures for terrorists, requires plastic
explosives to contain chemical markers, and strengthens penalties for many acts of terror-
ism. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301-823, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247-317 (1996) [hereinafter
Antiterrorism Act of 1996]; see also infra note 17.
Recent events including the Centennial Park bombing at the Atlanta Olympics have
triggered another round of proposals for increased antiterrorism spending. See Top Priority
in Terrorism Fight, THE POST AND COURMR (Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 1, 1996, at 12 (dis-
cussing a bill sponsored by Senator Judd Gregg which would add another $78.7 million
to the Antiterrorism Act of 1996).
9. Some of these suits have either been settled or dismissed, but of the original suits,
126 involved personal injuries (containing a total of 294 individual claims), 17 involved
property damage (containing a total of 159 claims, most of them for cars in the parking
garage), and 31 involved business interruption (containing 194 claims filed by companies
with offices in the World Trade Center or their insurers). See Wise, supra note 2, at 5.
10. See Pacelle, supra note 3, at BI.
11. For example, after the World Trade Center explosion some investors expressed
concerns about the Port Authority's ability to pay off some of its $4.1 billion in public
improvement bonds. See Jon Nordheimer, Crisis at the Twin Towers: The Port Authority;
Complex Insurance Issues in Aftermath of Explosion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at B5;
see also infra notes 225-36 and accompanying text (discussing macroeconomic effects of
imposing liability on landowners or tenants and the effect of exculpatory clauses).
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lords may have extensive implications for individual rights to pri-
vacy, as well as availability of fairly-valued rental space for more
controversial tenants. 2 These issues must be measured against the
harsh inequity that could result if civil suits are not allowed, as
some innocent victims will invariably not be made whole by insur-
ance or victim-compensation-type statutes. 3 Finally, no precedent
appears to squarely address civil recoveries for acts of domestic
terrorism as described here; 4 hence plaintiffs' reliance on the gen-
eral body of law dealing with landlord liability for criminal acts of
third parties. The question at hand then is whether this body of
law is the best way to achieve equitable victim compensation and
increased antiterrorism protection."
In the wake of terrorist attacks in the United States, injured
parties inadequately compensated by insurance or statutory assis-
tance programs are likely to turn to civil lawsuits against landown-
ers for relief. These suits will involve claims under the general
rubric of "landlord liability for criminal acts of third parties." If
based on current doctrines, claims involving terrorist acts will only
exacerbate problems of unpredictability, inequity, and inefficiency
endemic to claims presently involving more typical criminal acts. A
nationwide legal response consisting of federal legislation, govern-
ment-assisted insurance, and judicial decisions restricting recovery
to more narrowly drawn theories of liability is necessary to provide
more equitable and efficient answers to concerns about both victim
compensation and prevention.
Part I of this Note presents potential legal responses available
to victims of domestic terrorism by reviewing victim-compensation-
type statutes that might apply and by examining how potential civil
claims could be brought using landowner liability for criminal acts
of third parties. 6 The examination of contemporary landowner
12. See infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
14. The term "terrorism" is generally used here to refer to bombing-type acts since
they will most often have the greatest effect on landowners. See infra notes 134-41 and
accompanying text (discussing in more detail the definition of terrorism).
15. Throughout this Note, societal goals of increased victim compensation and
antiterrorism are presumed. This presumption is based on an economic theory of torts
which holds that liability is imposed on defendants in order to (1) compensate those who
are harmed and (2) provide incentives for torifeasors to limit risk-producing behavior to
efficient levels (in this case theoretically complete deterrence). See Uri Kaufman, When
Crime Pays: Business Landlords' Duty to Protect Customers From Criminal Acts Commit-
ted on the Premises, 31 S. TEx. L. REV. 89, 103 (1990).
16. The topic of landowner liability for criminal acts of third parties has been com-
mented on extensively. See, e.g., William H. Hardie, Jr., Foreseeabiliy: A Murky Crystal
Ball for Predicting Liability, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 349, 364 n.61 (1992) (listing no less than
fifteen law review pieces discussing landlord liability for criminal acts of third parties);
Kaufman, supra note 15, at 92 n.13 (discussing representative pieces advocating extreme
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liability will focus on problems arising from the use of foreseeabil-
ity as a legal element, since this appears to be a primary cause of
the current unpredictability in the law. The implications of applying
existing liability theories in the environment of commercial lease-
holds are also examined in detail since they will have particular
importance in the context of terrorism. Part II examines how issues
particularly related to terrorism will affect the application of exist-
ing doctrines, with the conclusion that the exclusive use of these
types of claims is not the most appropriate legal means to achieve
society's goals. Part Im presents alternative legal responses that
may provide more comprehensive victim compensation as well as
the predictable legal outcomes which will cause landowners to take
cost-effective preventive measures.
I. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL CLAIMS
A. Victim Compensation for Terrorist Attacks in the United
States-Statutory Claims
While there are some statutory provisions addressing victim
compensation for acts of terrorism, they have traditionally been
inadequate for a number of reasons. For example, the only appro-
priation aimed at providing direct assistance to victims of the Okla-
homa City bombing seems to be the $39 million Community De-
velopment Block Grant. 7 Other statutory provisions, which theo-
retically apply to victims of terrorism or other international inci-
dents, apply only in narrow sets of circumstances. For example, the
Torture Victim Protection Act provides that a "private cause of
action in federal court against individuals who commit such abuses
while acting under 'actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
proposals). Therefore, it is not within the scope of this Note to fully address it, rather the
discussions presented here focus on landowner liability for terrorist acts.
17. See Emergency Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 8, at 253 (making other appropria-
tions to various governmental agencies for rebuilding). In view of the magnitude of the
claims noted earlier, this is not likely to provide sufficient compensation. Additional assis-
tance should also be available to some government employees. See infra note 20 and
accompanying text (citing the Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
399, § 801, 100 Stat. 879 (1986)). Also, the Antiterrorism Act of 1996 specifically pro-
vides for mandatory victim restitution as well as additional compensation for victims of
terrorism via The Victims of Crime Act of 1984. See Antiterrorism Act of 1996, supra
note 8, at 1227-41 (mandatory victim restitution), 1243-47 (assistance to victims of terror-
ism). However, obtaining restitution from terrorists will probably not provide adequate
compensation in the majority of cases. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (not-
ing that terrorists will often have insufficient or hard-to-reach assets). Further, while the
Antiterrorism Act of 1996 specifically authorizes Federal funding of state crime victim
compensation programs which provide assistance to victims of terrorism, these types of
programs provide very limited compensation (for example, limited medical expenses and
lost wages). See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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any foreign nation,"' may be brought by or on behalf of a United
States citizen who was a victim of torture or summary execu-
tion." The Warsaw Convention 9 addresses incidents on interna-
tional airlines, and the Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act
provides relief only to victims associated with the United States
government. 0 Moreover, even those victims who do fall under
one of these "patchwork" statutory provisions are generally not
fully compensated 2 ' Thus, "[i]t is inevitable ... that there will
be individuals, including United States citizens, who will be victim-
ized by terrorism and forced to suffer injury without remedy." If
statutory recoveries are insufficient, victims are likely to turn to the
courts, bringing civil suits against one of the parties involved to
obtain compensation for their injuries.'
B. Civil Litigation-Background
In the types of terrorist acts contemplated here, parties that
could be potentially held responsible by victims include the terror-
ist organization, security firms, and landowners.24 Bringing suit
18. Michael Ratner & Beth Stephens, Tyrants, Terrorists and Torturers Brought to
Justice; U.S. Courts Provide Compensation for Victims, N.Y. LJ., May 15, 1995, at SS
(quoting the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992)).
19. The Warsaw Convention generally allows damages up to $75,000 against interna-
tional airlines for accidental injuries. See Deborah Squiers, Court Dismisses Damages Suit
in Airport Death, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 2, 1990, at 1.
20. See Kimberly A. Trotter, Compensating Victims of Terrorism: The Current Frame-
work in the United States, 22 Tax. INT'L LJ. 383, 392 (1987).
21. See id. at 393.
22. Id. at 401. Of course, this statement assumes that victims are unable to satisfy
losses completely via insurance recoveries.
23. While it may be possible for victims to obtain partial recovery under more tradi-
tional state-sponsored crime victim compensation funds, if available, these generally pro-
vide a significantly lower recovery than a civil suit, so there is still an incentive to sue.
See Rex A. Sharp, Paying for the Crimes of Others? Landowner Liability for Crimes on
the Premises, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 11, 16 n.11 (1987).
24. If the victim is an invitee of a commercial tenant, it might be possible for the
victim to include the commercial tenant as a responsible party, since if the lessee has
exclusive control and possession it may be considered to have the same protective duties
as a landlord. See, e.g., Daniels v. Shell Oil Co., 485 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972). For purposes of this Note, references to landlords or landowners are presumed to
include tenants where tenants retain exclusive control and possession of the leased premis-
es. Further, employees of tenants or landlords may likely be precluded from bringing suit
against one or the other since their injuries may be exclusively addressed by workers'
compensation. See, e.g., Daniel Wise, Law Firms Based in World Trade Center Regroup:
Lawyers See Potential for Dozens of Liability Claims, N.Y. L.., Mar. 2 1993, at 1 (not-
ing that Port Authority employees are precluded from recovery outside of worker's com-
pensation in the World Trade Center bombing); see also infra note 127 (discussing
invitees and employees of tenants). Recently, victims (including the owner of the World
Trade Center) have also attempted to hold chemical manufacturers responsible-alleging
that they could have made the ammonium nitrate, an ingredient in the bombs used in
Oklahoma City and at the World Trade Center, less explosive. See Hassan Fattah, Federal
1996]
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against the responsible terrorist organization itself is not unheard
of. For example, the son and daughter of Leon Klinghoffer sued
the Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") after their father
was murdered during the Achille Lauro incident. 5 However, as in
ordinary criminal cases, plaintiffs are not likely to target those
parties where recovery is difficult due to insufficient or hard-to-
reach assets. Security firms or landlords would seem to provide an
easier recovery. Indeed, if it can be proved that a security firm was
negligent in its provision of services, it should be susceptible to
liability itself.' However, a landlord would likely not escape lia-
bility even in that case, because if a landlord has an affirmative
duty to protect the plaintiff, then the landlord remains liable for
negligence in selecting, directing, or supervising the security agen-
cy. The likely target for injured plaintiffs will be the solvent
party with the most broadly defined responsibility for protec-
tion-the landownerY
C. Landowner Liability for Criminal Acts of Third Parties
This landowner-as-target hypothesis is borne out by the many
suits filed as a result of criminal acts of third parties. A victim of
a terrorist (or criminal) act could file a complaint against an alleg-
edly negligent landlord for failing to secure the premises under a
number of different theories, with differing likelihoods of success.
While landlords now have some duty to protect their tenants from
third-party crime in practically every jurisdiction,29 the extent of
Court Dismisses Case Against ICC, CHEMICAL WEEK, July 17, 1996, at 12.
25. See Alexander Stille, The PLO: A Suit Provides an Inside Look, 10 NAT'L L.. 1
(1987). The 1985 murder of Leon Klinghoffer (an elderly man in a wheelchair who was
ostensibly singled out because of his Jewish name and United States passport by Palestin-
ians who hijacked the cruise ship, Achille Lauro) came to symbolize terrorism in the late
1980's much as the World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, and Centennial Park bombings
do in the mid-1990's. Recently, the PLO has tentatively agreed to underwrite a peace
institute in order to settle the lawsuit. If the agreement is finalized, the Klinghoffers will
drop all legal claims against the PLO. See Beth J. Harpaz, Klinghoffers, PLO Plan Peace
Institute In Terror Victim's Memory, AP, Jan. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, AP File.
26. For example, what is certain to be the first of many lawsuits involving the Centen-
nial Park bombing was filed less than a week after the explosion. The suit, filed by a
woman injured in the blast, asks for $500,000 in damages and alleges that security guards
did not evacuate people quickly enough. See FBI Continues Investigation of Olympic Blast
(CNN news broadcast, Aug. 3, 1996).
27. See Sharp, supra note 23, at 54-55. Further, the landlord could be held liable via
vicarious liability. See id. at 55; see also Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506 (Ida-
ho 1990) (noting that security service's liability could be imputed to landlord as a result
of agency relationship).
28. And, where applicable, the landowner's insurer.
29. See B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Im-
posing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679,
790 (1992).
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such duty varies greatly depending upon the jurisdiction, and some-
times even the court."0
1. Background
For a full understanding of the problems involved in predict-
ing the success of these claims, some background is necessary. The
unsettled state of the law in this area is due to several factors.
Traditionally, landlords did not have any special duty regarding the
security of their tenants, a corollary of the rule that private parties
generally have no duty to rescue others.3' Only within the last
twenty-five years have landlords been held liable to their tenants
for criminal acts of third parties. 2 Another cause of the unsettled
nature of this doctrine may be some of the competing policy con-
siderations evident throughout its uneven evolution, appearing first
in the seminal case, Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment
Corp.3
3
The Kline court imposed a duty on residential landlords to
take reasonable steps to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal
acts. This case is generally said to mark the initial departure from
the traditional view that landlords had no duty to protect tenants.
The court achieved this by extending the traditional landlord duty
to maintain common areas in a reasonably safe condition beyond
prevention from physical defects to protection from criminal
acts.34 This was done by: (1) applying the warranty of habitability
30. See id. at 688. "[C]ourts within a single jurisdiction may differ as to the appro-
priate basis for liability; even appellate courts have misinterpreted or ignored their own
state supreme court's analysis of the issue." Id. at 688. One South Carolina District Court
has noted, "[tihe wide range of approaches taken by courts in other jurisdictions establish-
es only that support can be found for practically any position." Id. (quoting Cooke v.
Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 n.1 (D.S.C. 1990)).
31. See ROBERT S. SCHOSEtNsKI, AMhRICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 4.14
(1980).
32. While some have held that landlord tort liability has therefore undergone a "drastic
metamorphosis," see Glesner, supra note 29, at 684, or "revolution," others claim that this
aspect of landlord-tenant law merely reflects an "integration . . . into the mainstream of
contract and tort law." Charles J. Goetz, Wherefore the Landlord-Tenant Law "Revolu-
tion?"-Some Comments, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 592, 602 (1984). Under the latter theory,
these other branches of law began incorporating "such notions as optimal risk-bearing,
transaction costs, and externalities" that put pressure on "antiquated landlord-tenant doc-
trines." Id. at 599-600. This theory seems more plausible in that the landlord's duty to
protect tenants originated in the residential context, arguably in response to the changed
relationship (now considered contractual) of modem landlord and tenant. See, e.g., Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("In our judgment the
trend toward treating leases as contracts is wise and well-considered. . . . [L]eases of
urban dwelling unites should be interpreted and construed like any other contract."). Given
that this area of the law is responsive to changes in contract and tort doctrines, any re-
form in those areas will in turn influence the courts' adoption of landlord liability for
acts of terrorism.
33. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
34. See Miriam J. Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs of Crime? 2
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to defects in security, and (2) by recognizing a special relationship
between landlord and tenant;35 both of which are critical theories
of recovery in many jurisdictions today. While Kline provided an
important remedy to victims of crime, it was also the harbinger of
some of the uncertainty that continues to mark this area of the law.
In defining the standard of landlord liability, for example, the Kline
court equivocally remarked that the "landlord is no insurer of his
tenants' safety, but he certainly is no bystander."36 This rather
tentative assertion apparently reflects the tension the court recog-
nized in trying to fashion an efficient yet equitable result.37 Fur-
ther, Kline gives little guidance about what security measures are
required of landlords once duty is established.38 Subsequent cases
have read Kline both narrowly and broadly; depending on jurisdic-
tion and setting.39 Answers to the two questions raised in Kline,
namely the appropriate standard for establishing duty given effi-
ciency and equity concerns, and the definition of appropriate' re-
sponses to any duty imposed, will no doubt continue to occupy
courts when the crime in question is terrorism.
2. Current Theories of Recovery
Depending on the jurisdiction and court,' any number of
theories of landowner liability may be available for victims of
terrorism. Current theories may be aggregated into five principal
groups: (1) strict liability; (2) duty to maintain safe common areas;
(3) voluntary assumption of duty to protect; (4) contract; and (5)
negligence. An examination of the differing theories available is
important in order to determine which of them will prove most
CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 317-18 (1981).
35. See Joan L. Neisser, The Tenant as Consuner: Applying Strict Liability Principles
to Landlords, 64 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 527, 532 (1990).
36. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481.
37. For example, the court's first basis for liability, maintaining common areas in a
reasonably safe condition, perhaps reflects an economic efficiency argument; namely, since
the landlord has exclusive control, it is cost-effective for him, rather than tenants, to take
preventive action. Tenants' responses would necessarily be duplicative or involve collective
action with high transaction costs; tenants lack security expertise, and the landlord is in
the best position to ensure against risk via insurance. See Peter S. Selvin, Landlord Tort
Liability for Criminal Attacks on Tenants: Developments Since Kline, 9 REAL EST. LJ.
311, 315 (1981). On the other hand, in recognizing that there are limits to liability, or
that the landlord is not an "insurer," the court may be acknowledging that public policy
or fairness dictates that a landlord should not be liable when he is not at fault. See
Sharp, supra note 23, at 16.
38. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 31, § 4.15, at 219.
39. In this regard, Kline may be limited to its facts, in that the tenant specifically
advised the landlord about other prior criminal acts on the premises, see Kline, 439 F.2d
at 479 n.3, and the landlord had actually decreased security measures since the inception
of the tenant's lease. See SCHOSINSKt, supra note 31, § 4.15, at 218-19.
40. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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successful for victims of terrorism. Outcomes for victims of more
typical crimes vary primarily because their theories of liability use
different definitions of foreseeability and require different landlord
behavior. Further, different theories emphasize certain underlying
policy concerns, which could have implications for how complaints
alleging landlord liability for terrorist acts will be received by
courts. Finally, although landlord liability for criminal acts first
arose in a residential context, this Note focuses on commercial
landlord liability since terrorist acts are most likely to involve that
type of leasehold. While the appropriateness of the application is
examined at the conclusion of this section,1 commentators feel
that most jurisdictions have generally "made no explicit distinction
between commercial and residential landlords" in holding landlords
liable for the criminal acts of third parties.42 Therefore, this dis-
cussion initially assumes a commercial setting.'
a. Safe Common Areas
The duty to maintain common areas in a safe condition is
perhaps the most traditional of all the theories of recovery. As the
court in Kline noted, this duty applies the same rationale as the
longstanding duty of landlords to protect tenants from unsafe phys-
ical defects." To sustain this claim, a tenant must show both that
41. See infra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
42. Haines, supra note 34, at 343 n.144. See also Marvin F. Milich, Protecting Com-
mercial Landlords From Liability for Criminal Acts of Third Parties, 15 REAL EST. LJ.
236, 241 (1987) (citing cases involving commercial landlords where theories of recovery
paralleled those in cases involving residential landlords). Further, it is generally acknowl-
edged that residential landlord/tenant law was the "impetus for the modem trend imposing
a duty upon commercial landowners.' Donna Lee Welch, Case Comment: Ann M. v.
Pacific Plaza Shopping Center The California Supreme Court Retreats from its "Totality
of the Circumstances" Approach to Premises Liability, 28 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1064 n.64
(1994).
43. With this said, the first theory listed above, strict liability, sparingly adopted in
residential suits, does not seem to have ever been successfully applied in the commercial
context. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 23, at 73-76 (citing Davis v. Allied Supermarkets,
Inc., 547 P.2d 963, 965 (Okla. 1976), which held that in spite of the risk spreading poli-
cy behind strict liability, "it does not seem that shifting the financial loss caused by
crime from one innocent victim to another innocent victim is proper"); Jeffrey Fowler,
Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard: The Key to Unlocking a Landlord's Duty to Provide
Security, 23 J. MARSHAL L. REV. 131 (1989) (discussing Rowe v. Lombard State Bank,
531 N.E.2d 1358 (111. 1988) which rejected strict liability but held the commercial land-
lord liable on other grounds). Further, even those who would argue for increased applica-
tion of strict liability for landlords in the residential setting seem to agree that its applica-
tion to the commercial setting is not appropriate. See Frank F. Gibson & Elliot Klayman,
Landlord Liability: A New Dimension, 25 A.t. Bus. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1987) (holding that the
policy considerations favoring strict liability in the defective products context apply in the
residential but not commercial leasehold context). Therefore, this theory is not discussed
here.
44. See Kline, 439 F.2d at 481.
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the landlord had control of the area and knowledge of the defective
condition, and that the defects foreseeably enhanced the risk of
criminal activity.45 Accessibility defects (e.g. defective locks) seem
to trigger liability most often under this theory.' Perhaps because
of its traditional nature, this approach has gained wide acceptance,
even in jurisdictions reluctant to recognize landlord liability.47 This
theory of liability may have important ramifications for holding
landlords liable for acts of terrorism due to its focus on the
landlord's exclusive control of common areas. For example, in
Kline, the court noted that the landlord is in an even better posi-
tion than the police to take preventive measures. "Municipal police
cannot patrol the entryways and the hallways, the garages and the
basements of private multiple unit ... dwellings. They are neither
equipped, manned, nor empowered to do so."'  This type of em-
phasis on control and efficiency provides a powerful argument for
using this theory to require landlords to provide at least minimal
structural security measures against terrorist acts.
b. Voluntary Assumption of Duty
Another traditional theory of landlord liability involves a
landowner's voluntarily assumed duty to provide security. Under
this theory, if a landowner voluntarily assumes the performance of
duties for security, he should be required to perform those duties
carefully.49 Even courts that have limited a landowner's duty to
protect a tenant from the criminal acts of others absent any affir-
mative conduct on the part of the landowner would likely find a
duty if the landlord provided some type of security in what proved
to be a negligent manner."0 In practice, these claims can arise as a
45. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 690.
46. See id. at 691.
47. See id. at 690.
48. Kline, 439 F.2d at 484.
49. See Bob Gibbins & Yii-Chwen (Francis) Pan, Landlords and Third-Party Criminal
Conduct, TRIAL, Mar. 1986, at 48. Many courts that have adopted this rule cite the Re-
statement of Torts in support, which states that:
[o]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a)
his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the
harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 323 (1977). This is effectively an exception to the
"no duty to rescue" rule, which holds that "[tihe fact that the actor realizes or should
realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." § 314.
50. See John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observa-
tions About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Oth-
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result of the landlord's express or implied promise to provide secu-
rity, including representations in lease terms, oral statements, and
advertisements."' Many decisions based on this theory use an im-
plicit balancing test to determine liability, considering the degree of
reliance assumed by the injured tenant as well as the potential
burden to the landlord. 2 Courts using this balancing test may
have particular difficulty in applying it to terrorism since both the
degree of reliance by the tenant and burden to the landowner in
preventing the crime are generally very high. Some commentators
note that because this theory provides no positive incentive to
provide security it results in landlords being less inclined to offer
increased security protection.53 Choosing to provide no security is
theoretically risky for landlords, however, because the definition of
what constitutes a voluntary provision of security differs by juris-
diction. 4 What constitutes a provision (or further, a negligent pro-
vision) of antiterrorism security is likely to be even less clear than
in the context of more traditional criminal acts, so that predicting
liability will continue to be at least as difficult.
c. Contract
Claims brought under contract theories may rely on either
express or implied warranties 5 to provide security. A recovery
theory based on express warranties would suggest that a landlord
has a duty to provide the type and amount of security adver-
tised 6 The World Trade Center litigation provides an example of
ers, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 867, 884.
51. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 696. A landlord's failure to provide adequate securi-
ty could also result in a breach of contract claim. See id. at 698 n.88.
52. See David C. Markatos, Property Law: The Growing Accountability of Landlords
for Third-Party Criminal Attacks, 1991 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 501, 508. Cases brought
under this theory are often fact-intensive and result in unpredictable jurisprudence. See id.
53. See id. at 510.
54. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 696. See also Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d
518 (Del. 1987) (finding that since mall owner had voluntarily undertaken to provide a
security program, sufficiency of that program constituted jury question).
55. In the residential context, a "handful" of courts have held that the implied warran-
ty of habitability should include a duty to provide security. See Markatos, supra note 52,
at 521-22. In the commercial context, a duty to provide security "would have to be con-
fimed as an independent material provision of the lease." Haines, supra note 34, at 326
n.91. While some commentators have argued for the extension of residential habitability
warranties to certain commercial settings, see Robert A. Levinson & Michael N. Silver,
Do Commercial Property Tenants Possess Warranties of Habitability? 14 REAL EST. LJ.
59 (1985), in practice such application has been restricted. When used in the commercial
context, this theory has generally involved conditions existing at the inception of the
lease. See Gibbons & Pan, supra note 49, at 48.
56. See Sharp, supra note 23, at 30. This claim may also give rise to a tort claim of
misrepresentation or fraud. See e.g., O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Man-
agement, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that cause of action
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how liability based on express contract provisions could be trig-
gered in the context of terrorism. One large tenant, Dean Witter,
claims that it raised concerns about safety when it negotiated its
lease in 1984 and 1985, but that it was assured in writing that
security provisions at the World Trade Center surpassed "'all other
comparable building complexes within the city' and that the park-
ing garage was secure."' Dean Witter claims that it never would
have leased the space, for about one billion dollars over twenty
years, if it knew that the Port Authority already had knowledge
that the parking garage was vulnerable to terrorist attack. 8 Dean
Witter is asking to rescind its lease and demanding more than $220
million in property and punitive damages.59
Contract claims are usually thought to be brought less fre-
quently than tort claims, since damages for the former are general-
ly very limited-compensating the injured party for property dam-
age, but not providing for pain and suffering or punitive
damages." Since contract claims are very fact-specific, they tend
not to be as susceptible to arguments based on broader notions of
social policy as some of the other theories presented here.6' This
will likely be a disadvantage for tenant-victims of terrorism urging
courts to extend liability beyond the "four comers" of the lease.
Further, of course, the injured party must have a legally cognizable
basis for recovery under the contract as a party in privity, or per-
haps as a third-party beneficiary.
However, there are often clear advantages to contract claims
for plaintiffs. In one case where the court held that a landlord did
not have a duty to protect a tenant from the criminal act of a third
party, a recovery based on an express contract provision for the
value of property stolen was not precluded. 2 By imposing a con-
tractual obligation to furnish security measures, courts may provide
exists if tenant justifiably relies on landlord's misrepresentations concerning safety). But
see Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1216 (D.S.C. 1990) (stating
that landlord's opinion that apartment was "safe" was inadequate to support claim for mis-
representation).
57. Pacelle, supra note 3, at B10.
58. See id.; see also infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of
whether discovery of previous security studies should be allowed).
59. See Pacelle, supra note 3, at B10; Douglas Feiden, D. Witter Fights WTC Lease,
Says It Was Duped by PA, DAILY NEWS (New York), July 25, 1996, at 36. Some have
suggested that Dean Witter's suit is largely motivated by business reasons rather than
security concerns. While the firm locked in to a long-term lease at $35 per square foot,
rents in the building have generally decreased to the point that some tenants now pay less
than $25 per square foot. See id.
60. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 698 n.88. Further, when contract claims are brought,
they often appear as alternatives to claims based on tort theories and are therefore cursori-
ly pleaded and prone to dismissal by courts. See Markatos, supra note 52, at 516.
61. See Markatos, supra note 52, at 516.
62. See Richmond Medical Supply Co. v. Clifton, 369 S.E.2d 407 (Va. 1988).
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tenants with some means of correcting dangerous security problems
before a tragedy occurs. 3 This aspect of contract claims may also
have particular application for the prevention of terrorism to ensure
that landowners provide bargained-for structural and procedural
safeguards. Finally, especially in the commercial context, a
landlord's liability may be modified by contractual provisions, such
as exculpatory clauses, which generally result in a more efficient
allocation of risk between the two parties.'
d. Negligence
The clear majority of claims in this area are based on negli-
gence theories. 5 In order to sustain a negligence claim, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant's behavior created an unreasonable
risk of harm by departing from a reasonable standard of care, and
that such behavior was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's dam-
ages." A review of the various negligence formulations courts use
provides ample support for the contention that the law regarding
landlord liability for the criminal acts of third parties is unsettled.
In general, a landlord's duty to provide security in this context
may be based on a special relationship, special circumstances, or
statutory requirements. 7 Recurring questions raised by this type of
liability that have particular applications to terrorism include: when
a criminal act should be deemed to be foreseeable; when a third
party's criminal act should be considered a superseding cause; and
when a landlord's response should be deemed reasonable." Failure
63. See Markatos, supra note 52, at 516.
64. See infra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
65. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 688.
66. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
67. With this said, the last basis for negligence claims, statutory violations, appears
primarily in the residential context. Statutory requirements for the provision of different
security measures do appear to be a growing trend, however, and may be applied with
more frequency in the commercial context in the future. A landlord's compliance with
statutory requirements usually does not protect him from liability, however, since they
generally represent only minimum measures. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 702. For these
reasons, and since no statutes currently address required antiterrorism measures, this basis
for liability is not addressed extensively here, although it is suggested infra at notes 244-
46 and accompanying text.
68. Of these questions, the issue of when an act is foreseeable (thereby establishing
duty) is the most troublesome and is discussed in detail in the text. The issue of proxi-
mate cause, or more specifically, determining when a criminal act intervenes between the
negligence of the landlord and injury to the tenant, is also dependent on foreseeability
since if the defendant should have foreseen the criminal's actions, such actions will not
be considered superseding causes. See RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) TORTS §§ 448-49 (1977).
Technically, the plaintiff must also prove the threshold issue that the landlord's act or
omission was the legal cause of his injury as well. However, courts have apparently not
discussed this concept in detail. One author contends that while it is not clear that the
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to adequately resolve these questions suggests that under the cur-
rent state of the law, landlords are largely unable to accurately
predict either liability or the appropriate level of responsive securi-
ty precautions.69 These problems will only be exacerbated when
negligence claims, based on landlords' failure to protect tenants
from terrorism, are allowed.
i. Negligence Formulations
Courts first developed the negligence formulation that land-
lords had a duty to protect tenants from criminal acts of third
parties based on their special relationship because of the changing
circumstances of the modem residential tenant. The underlying
basis for this per se duty seems to be the landlord's superior posi-
tion to perceive and prevent risks of criminal conduct." For ex-
causal link between provisions of security and likelihood of crime is legally sufficient,
"situational crime prevention" studies do find that there is some relationship between
opportunity and crime. Madeline Johnson, Landlord's Responsibility for Crime: Determin-
ing Legal Causation, 17 REAL EST. LJ. 234, 241 (1989). Similar arguments may arise
with regard to the relationship between "opportunity" and the incidence of terrorism, al-
though terrorists' motivations differ from those of "ordinary" criminals. See infra notes
140, 145 and accompanying text.
While it has apparently not been a recurring issue in the regular crime cases, if
landlords are held liable for the effects of terrorist acts, they may attempt to argue that
the behavior of controversial tenants (e.g., performing abortions) itself constitutes a
superseding cause that precludes their being held liable. See infra notes 211-24 (discussing
the effects of landlord liability on controversial tenants).
The reasonableness of a landlord's response also involves issues of foreseeability
since landlords effectively need to predict what types of security will prove adequate to
prevent attempted crimes. However, courts have not been consistent in finding what mea-
sures constitute adequate security. They have addressed the sufficiency of any number of
security measures, from security guards to alarms to lighting, in different ways. See Jardel
Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 525 (Del. 1987) (holding that whether one security guard
on premises for each nightly shift was sufficient was question for jury); Peacock's, Inc. v.
Shreveport Alarm Co., 510 So. 2d 387, 400 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (finding landlord partial-
ly liable for negligently allowing access to alarm controls); Shepard v. Drucker & Falk,
306 S.E.2d 199, 202 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing landlord to present testimony com-
paring lighting at apartment complex with other complexes, since it was proper attempt to
show whether reasonable care had been exercised). But see Carrigan v. New World Enter-
prises, Ltd., 446 N.E.2d 265, 270 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (holding landlord's breach of con-
tractual obligation to maintain burglar alarm was not sufficient to trigger liability for
tenant's rape). In one case, the court denied recovery where "the plaintiff failed to adduce
testimony from a qualified expert in the field of building security thereby leaving the
jury" to speculate regarding the deficiencies in security, if any, at the time of the inci-
dent. lannelli v. Powers, 498 N.Y.S.2d 377, 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). Certainly, ques-
tions of when more sophisticated antiterrorism security measures are reasonable will be
even more difficult for courts to handle. For example, when are crash barriers and photo
I.D. access reasonable? This issue seems destined to foster a battle of experts at trial. See
supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra notes 142-63.
69. See, e.g., Glesner, supra note 29, at 707.
70. See id. at 704.
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ample, in Samson v. Saginaw Professional Building, Inc.," the
Michigan Supreme Court, in adopting the special relationship theo-
ry in a commercial context, held that "[t]he existence of this rela-
tionship between the defendant [landlord] and its tenants and
invitees placed a duty upon the landlord to protect them from
unreasonable risk of physical harm." Conversely, under the spe-
cial circumstances formulation of negligence, foreseeability of a
criminal attack serves to establish both duty and proximate
cause.73 For example, in Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard,74 the
court, allowing a claim for the tenant's employees in spite of a
finding that the landlord-tenant relationship was not a special rela-
tionship, held that "when knowledge of foreseeable harm is com-
bined with the landlord's sole ability to guard against it, without
undue burden, the landlord has the duty."'
ii. Foreseeability-Definitions
The definition of foreseeability is often the determining factor
in negligence claims, with more expansive definitions more likely
to result in findings of duty. Three more major and two more
minor definitions of foreseeability are commonly used. The most
restrictive view of foreseeability requires that the landowner actual-
ly had notice of the risks involved. Foreseeability is generally
proven under this definition by representations made by tenants or
others, either notifying the landlord of past crimes as in Kline,76
or that attacks are possible or likely as in Samson.7' In a recent
case, to prove that the defendant landlord had knowledge of exist-
ing risks, the plaintiff introduced evidence in the form of a letter
from a commercial tenant advising the landlord of crimes on the
premises and requesting that a security review be performed.7
71. 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975).
72. Id. at 849 (citation omitted).
73. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 703. Unlike under the special relationship formula-
tion, there is no presumption that landlord's have a duty to protect tenants. Id.
74. 531 N.E.2d 1358 (111. 1988).
75. Id. at 1367-68. Some commentators have noted that this dual role of foreseeability
is problematic. While foreseeability is usually understood to define and limit the scope of
a pre-existing duty, it is not generally used to "justify the imposition of duty." Haines,
supra note 34, at 339; see also Sharp, supra note 23, at 21.
76. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 480 n.3, 483
(D.C. Cir 1970).
77. Samson v. Saginaw Professional Building, Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843, 851 (Mich.
1975).
78. See Old v. Lefnark Management Co., 1995 WL 500619, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App.
Aug. 24, 1995). The letter also requested that "if the results of this survey indicate addi-
tional security is needed for the common areas, please take the appropriate action neces-
sary to protect our employees and customers." Id. The actual notice standard is also ap-
parently reflected in Rowe, where plaintiffs had to prove that the landlord actually knew
1996]
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This type of subjective condition has significant drawbacks in that
it may discourage landlords from looking for unsafe conditions and
from being amenable to tenants' reports of unsafe conditions.79
Such a foreseeability rule for terrorism would generally result in
landowners avoiding liability for these reasons, although perhaps
not in the World Trade Center case.8" Most jurisdictions imposing
a duty based on foreseeability now use some type of "knew or
should have known" standard instead.8'
The prior similar incidents rule is a less restrictive, middle-
ground definition which requires that a plaintiff produce evidence
of prior similar criminal acts on the landowner's premises to estab-
lish foreseeability.82 While widely used, especially in commercial
settings,83 the prior similar incidents rule also has several draw-
backs. First, the landowner is effectively allowed one free assault
before he can be held to have a duty.84 Second, some commenta-
tors and courts have stated that the prior similar incidents rule
leads to "arbitrary results and distinctions" since it is often unclear
how close in time, near in location, or analogous in conduct the
prior incidents must be.' If this standard were adopted in land-
owner liability for acts of terrorism cases, issues about where to
draw the line for terrorist incidents (e.g., between a prior explosion
and a bomb threat) would undoubtedly be at the forefront.
In perhaps the most famous denouncement of the prior similar
incidents rule, the California Supreme Court, in 1985, abandoned it
in Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital,86 adopting instead the
that unauthorized possession of master keys would lead to illegal entry. See 531 N.E.2d
at 1367-68,
79. See Fowler, supra note 43, at 145. In some cases, it is clear that courts have also
used the defendants' security precautions as evidence of their "constructive notice" of
risks. See Hardie, supra note 16, at 400.
80. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text (discussing the existence of a secu-
rity report warning of susceptibility to terrorist attacks).
81. See Fowler, supra note 43, at 145.
82. See Welch, supra note 42, at 1060.
83. See id.
84. See Markatos, supra note 52, at 513 (quoting the court in Isaacs v. Huntington
Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985) (criticized by Ann. M. v. Pacific Plaza Shop-
ping Center, 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993))). This prompted one Florida court in rejecting this
definition to declare that it would not "sacrifice the first victim's right to safety upon the
altar of foreseeability by slavishly adhering to the . . . notion that at least one criminal
assault must have occurred on the premises before the landlord can be held liable." Pater-
son v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting the prior simi-
lar incidents rule).
85. See Markatos, supra note 52, at 513. In jurisdictions following this rule, there is a
general sense that in order to qualify as "prior similar incidents," crimes must be on the
premises, be sufficient in number and recent enough to put the landlord on notice, and be
sufficiently similar in nature to the incident in question. See Glesner, supra note 29, at
706.
86. 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985). See Welch, supra note 42, at 1061.
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totality of the circumstances definition discussed below. However,
in 1993, the California Supreme Court essentially re-adopted the
prior similar incidents rule in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping
Center,7 holding that a landowner is rarely, if ever, liable to a
plaintiff absent evidence of prior similar crimes on the premises.8
The return to the use of the prior similar incidents rule in Califor-
nia perhaps signals that the view of the landlord as "social insurer"
has fallen out of favor.8 9 If so, the curtailment of pro-victim ap-
proaches may have implications for how the application of land-
owner liability to acts of terrorism will be received by courts. In
contrast, the rising rate of violent crime has often been held to be
the primary influence in expanding the duty to protect." Thus, it
seems likely that judges will also feel pressure to interpret stan-
dards expansively in response to the increasing visibility of terror-
ism. How courts respond to these conflicting demands for either
more restrictive or expansive liability in addressing landlord liabili-
ty for acts of terrorism may depend on the alternatives to this type
of liability presented.9'
The totality of the circumstances approach mentioned above
represents the high water mark of pro-victim landowner liability
theories, requiring that courts analyze foreseeability in light of all
the facts and on a case-by-case basis.' While some jurisdictions
87. 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993).
88. See id. The court went on to note, however, that the foreseeability of the harm
should still be balanced against the burden of the duty imposed-reserving the questions
of whether a commercial leasehold that is "inherently dangerous" or in the immediate
proximity to a substantially similar business that has experienced prior crimes could trig-
ger a duty without itself being the site of any prior similar incidents. See id. at 215-16;
Welch, supra note 42, at 1065-66.
89. As one commentator noted, "The Ann M. Court reasoned that landowners would
unjustly become the insurers of public safety if plaintiffs could prove the degree of fore-
seeability required to impose liability without offering evidence of prior similar crimes."
Mark Bianchi, Tort-Law--Revisiting Isaacs: A Commercial Landowner's Duty to Protect
Against Criminal Acts of Third Parties-Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 28
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 306, 311 (1994). "The court decided to revisit Issacs in light of the
increase in violent crime and pressure from the court of appeals." Id. at 311 n.29 (cita-
tions omitted).
90. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 679-82 (noting a correlation between increasing
crime rates and landlord liability in general); Milich, supra note 42, at 236 (noting that
"not to be overlooked as influencing modem-day judges is the rising crime rate."); Welch,
supra note 42, at 1057 (noting that "crime problems of epidemic proportions caused
courts to recognize ... exceptions to their judicially created no-duty rules.").
91. See infra Part IH discussing alternatives.
92. See Markatos, supra note 52, at 514. Obviously, prior similar crimes on the pre-
mises remain highly probative under this theory, which effectively holds only that an
absence of prior similar crimes does not foreclose liability. See, e.g., Whittaker v.
Saraceno, 635 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (Mass. 1994) ("The previous occurrence of similar
criminal acts on or near a defendant's premises is a circumstance to consider, but the
foreseeability question is not conclusively answered in favor of a defendant landlord if
there has been no prior similar criminal act.").
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have applied it less frequently to commercial leaseholds,93 the to-
tality of the circumstances definition has been called the "touch-
stone" of foreseeability. 4 Factors that come in under the totality
of the circumstances rule range from evidence of neighborhood
crime (e.g., a computer printout of police records of reported
crimes in the area),95 to environmental criminology studies (in-
cluding "physical structure of the building, lighting, traffic patterns,
and social and ecological circumstances linked to the potential for
a criminal event").' By analogy, if studies about how terrorists
choose targets are generally available, they could provide a basis
for recovery under this formulation.' The extent of a landowner's
role in determining foreseeability is unclear under this definition.
Two more minor definitions of foreseeability that have ap-
peared occasionally in various jurisdictions are the "first line of
defense" and "tempting target" theories. Under the former, even if
foreseeability is rather low (e.g., no prior incidents), when a
landlord's nonfeasance amounts to what would generally be consid-
ered gross negligence (e.g., no door locks), courts will usually find
a duty." While only a few courts have adopted the "tempting
target" theory, a number of have acknowledged it as a factor in the
determination on some other basis." This theory proposes that
some leaseholds are by their nature particularly attractive for crime:
bars, concert halls, and casinos."r Both of these theories may
have implications for the application of the landowner liability to
terrorism in that the duty to simply warn of a terrorist threat would
seem to be a good candidate for the "first line of defense
rule,"'0' and leaseholds with controversial clients (e.g., abortion
clinics) might be seen as "tempting targets" for terrorists. 02
93. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 15, at 97 ("To date, only California has adhered to
this rule in the business-invitee context.").
94. See Markatos, supra note 52, at 514.
95. See Green Cos. v. DiVencenzo, 432 So. 2d 86 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
96. Daniel P. Kennedy, Inadequate Security and Premises Liability, TRIAL, June, 1991,
at 56.
97. If a landlord is aware of such reports, at some level of specificity to her premises
she may be considered to have notice under even the most restrictive definition of fore-
seeability. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing the role of notice in
varying definitions of foreseeability).
98. See Kaufman, supra note 15, at 97.
99. See id. at 98.
100. See Sharp, supra note 23, at 32-34.
101. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text (discussing the use of warnings
against terrorist attacks).
102. See infra notes 211-24 and accompanying text (discussing the negative implications
to these types of tenants of imposing this duty on landlords).
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iii. Foreseeability-Problems
Whatever its definition, determining foreseeability will likely
be critical in predicting landowner liability in cases involving ter-
rorist acts. When foreseeability is used both to establish duty and
causation, it becomes a "murky crystal ball."' 3 If foreseeability is
used as a method of establishing liability in claims involving ter-
rorism, courts must find a way to cure the problems of inefficiency
and inequity it now generates. One such problem is that foresee-
ability is susceptible to judges' and juries' subjective beliefs. In the
tort context, it seems that foreseeability should be related to fault.
When applied to criminal acts, however, its boundaries often seem
defined by courts' concerns about public policy."° For "new"
causes of action, like landowner liability for terrorism, courts may
be especially tempted to use policy considerations to define fore-
seeability.' °
Similarly, judges and juries tend to focus on the severity of
resulting harm when determining, with the benefit of hindsight,
whether a criminal act was foreseeable. For example, a landowner's
duty may be framed as to avoid creating unreasonable risks for his
tenants. In assessing "reasonableness," the landowner should con-
sider the severity of the harm, alternatives available to him, and
the probability of harm."t While the severity of harm from ter-
rorist acts is admittedly great, probability is very low for most
leaseholds. Further, while the cost of safer alternatives may be
generally low for ordinary criminal acts (e.g., safer locks, more
lighting), the costs of preventing terrorism are generally signifi-
cant. 7 This analysis would therefore suggest that fact finders
103. Hardie, supra note 16, at 367.
104. In fact, foreseeability has been held to just be a tool of the courts; changing as
needed to mask public policy decisions about how broad a landowner's duty should be.
See Hardie, supra note 16, at 393; Welch, supra note 42, at 1057 n.25.
105. For example, one commentator feels that
[C]ourts are uncomfortable with jury determinations of foreseeability as an ele-
ment of duty in causes of action that have not yet matured and that have not
yet been established as common theories with which the court is familiar. Until
this maturation occurs, courts simply will continue to decide cases on the basis
of policy considerations.
Hardie, supra note 16, at 392. Of course, this does not bode well for the development of
a clear definition of foreseeability in landowner liability for acts of terrorism.
106. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 247. This is basically a permutation of the famous
"Hand formula." See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
One commentator has noted, however, that in an evaluation of this "formula" for criminal
acts, the third factor, probability, has been underplayed since it is the most difficult to
evaluate. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 248. Johnson further notes that empirical studies
suggest a causal link between physical conditions controlled by the landlord and crime,
but that there is no way to determine the exact probability of a given crime given a
certain condition. See id.; supra note 68.
107. Further, in evaluating available alternatives, the landowner is generally found culpa-
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must be especially reminded of the latter two components of the
foreseeability/duty decision when determining liability for terrorist
acts, since they will generally serve to temper the role that the
severity of the harm should play.
Another of the problems with foreseeability in this context is
whether it should be a question for the judge or jury. Because
foreseeability is used in different ways by many courts, it is not
clear whether courts have uniformly decided who should resolve
the foreseeability issue.' 8 What is clear is that if the question
does go to the jury, the landlord will likely be the loser. Jury
verdicts are likely to turn not so much on facts but on the jury's
sense of right and wrong."° This puts landlords at an unfair dis-
advantage, creates confusion about what is required of them, and
pressures them to settle."0 Problems with juries deciding foresee-
ability will be greater in terrorism cases, as compared to ordinary
criminal cases, since methods of determining foreseeability, as well
as what constitutes a reasonable security response, are more likely
to be beyond the common knowledge of the average juror.
Given this status quo, the chances for developing a clear defi-
nition of foreseeability for use in cases involving landowner liabili-
ty for acts of terrorism are slim. When standards are unclear, some
commentators believe that landlords will "overprotect.' The re-
sulting "uncertainty zone" is wasteful to society because the
amount spent on protection (and passed on to consumers) will not
reduce enough violent acts to justify its costs, resulting in an inef-
ficient use of resources."2 Further, cases where summary judg-
ment would have been proper instead go to the jury to determine
foreseeability; resulting in judicial inefficiency."' Finally, a vague
ble if a reasonable person would have chosen an option that would have avoided the
injury. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 248. However, reasonable landlords have much less
information about what measures will prevent the commission of terrorism than they do
about regular crime.
108. See Hardie, supra note 16, at 390.
109. See Kaufman, supra note 15, at 100.
110. As one commentator has noted:
[C]ourts and commentators have long recognized that any case which goes to a
jury under general instructions on the foreseeability of a heinous crime almost
invariably results in a verdict for the plaintiff. With hindsight, juries inevitably
find that more security should have been employed since the security provided
was in fact inadequate. It is precisely for this reason that most cases surviving
a motion for summary judgment result in large settlements for the plaintiffs.
Id.
111. In other words, spend more on protection than the theoretically efficient legal stan-
dard would require in order to take into account the court's "margin of error" in deter-
mining fault. See Kaufman, supra note 15, at 105.
112. See id.
113. See Sharp, supra note 23, at 19.
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standard of duty works to the immediate economic disadvantage of
the defendant, or landlord.' 4 Therefore, should the negligence
concept of landowner liability be applied to acts of terrorism,
courts or legislatures must develop a more definitive standard of
duty in order to ensure that these inefficiencies and inequities are
not perpetuated.
3. Implications of a Commercial Setting
While the vast majority of the early cases imposing landlord
liability for criminal acts involved residential buildings, acts of
terrorism will probably target commercial leaseholds. Even though
many commentators think that most jurisdictions have not distin-
guished between the two settings,"' not all commentators or
courts are of that opinion and many believe the application of the
law should not be the same." 6 An analysis of the desirability of
symmetry between the rules for residential and commercial lease-
holds is important since any valid differences should affect the
standards of duty adopted for terrorism.
First, since landlord liability for security was developed largely
in response to courts' objectives of improving the quality of afford-
able housing," 7 the initial purpose behind the imposition of liabil-
ity is different. Second, commercial tenants are generally in a much
better bargaining position than residential tenants; they are more
likely to be able to negotiate for the levels of security protection
they feel are adequate."' This seems due to the fact that com-
mercial tenants generally possess more resources and the fact that
114. There is no reason for plaintiffs not to forego suit because their legal fees are a
percentage of recovery; there is little incentive for defendants to proceed to trial because
they do have real legal costs and the probability of success and range of potential ver-
dicts will be hard to quantify. See Hardie, supra note 16, at 405. This arguably puts
defendants in the position of settling on amounts in excess of optimum.
115. See supra note 42.
116. See Royal Neckwear Co. v. Century City, Inc., 252 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that a commercial landlord does not owe a duty to safeguard tenant's
property from foreseeable criminal activity by third parties); Craig v. AAR Realty, 576
A.2d 688 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (denying liability of owner of large mall who did not
retain control); Czech v. Aspen Indus. Ctr., 368 A.2d 938 (NJ. Super. 1976) (rejecting
liability for landlord, the court distinguished commercial from residential tenancies in
terms of fairness and public interest); Exxon v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1993)
(stating that the general rule in a commercial setting "is that a landlord is not liable to a
lessee for injuries caused by an unsafe condition, which can include the unreasonable risk
of harm from criminal intrusions, unless the landlord was aware of the latent dangerous
condition at the time the premises were let."); Glesner, supra note 29, at 684 n.16 (noting
that "many courts apply a lower standard of security for commercial buildings").
117. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 684 n.16.
118. See, e.g., Gibson & Klayman, supra note 43, at 27-28 (noting that "in most in-
stances [commercial tenants] bargaining power is comparable--or perhaps superior-to that
of the landlord. They can protect themselves by demanding express warranties that im-
prove safety").
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the commercial market generally offers more alternatives than the
residential market."9 Third, a landlord's physical control over the
premises in the commercial setting is much lower. 2 The need
for public access, as well as a larger area to be protected, normally
means that commercial buildings require more extensive securi-
ty."' A further control-type distinction is the definition of the
premises boundary line. For example, when are parking lots or the
street in front of a leasehold within the area that a landlord should
protect?": Fourth, security in a commercial setting generally has
a different purpose than in a residential one. Banks and stores do
not hire guards for the primary purpose of protecting customers;
they are there to protect assets."l An important economic distinc-
tion between the two settings is that most commercial tenants carry
insurance and can theoretically pass on the costs of their own
security measures through increased prices.'24 Finally, commercial
tenants are often in a better position than the landlord to assess the
safety of the premises; defects in security may remain undiscovered
by a landlord unaware of a commercial tenant's particular safety
needs. Commercial tenants are more likely to make a thorough
inspection of the premises to determine if it is suitable for its
purposes, relying less on the representations of the landlord."2
These considerations suggest that the duty to provide security in a
commercial context should be lower than in a residential one."as
119. See Selvin, supra note 37, at 328 n.61 (quoting Dietz v. Miles Holding Corp., 277
A.2d 108, 110 n.2 (D.C. App. 1971) which stated that "the residential housing market
offers markedly less alternatives to tenants than does the commercial office building mar-
ket').
120. See id. at 323. For example, most commercial buildings by definition must be
open to the public during the business day. In one case involving a government building,
the court held that it was that nature of a such a building that it "remain accessible and
open to the steady flow of dissimilar citizens" and that this was a reality that the court
should realize in imposing liability. Id. at 327 (quoting Turner v. United States, 473 F.
Supp. 317 (D.D.C. 1979)).
121. See id. at 325.
122. An apartment building, for example, is fairly self-contained. A commercial premis-
es, like the World Trade Center, can extend over a city block (parking garages, walk-
ways, plazas, etc.). Theoretically, the landlord's protective liability should diminish as does
his control-varying with proximity, although it is not clear where it should end. See
Selvin, supra note 37, at 330; Sharp, supra note 23, at 14 n.3.
123. See Selvin, supra note 37, at 328.
124. See id. at 324.
125. See Gibson & Klayman, supra note 43, at 27. This consideration may not translate
well to the terrorism context because of the often sophisticated and extensive security and
structural measures required. For example, in the World Trade Center case, Dean Witter,
certainly a sophisticated tenant, claims to have relied on the Port Authority's representa-
tions. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
126. This rationale does not necessarily imply the same result if only one tenant occu-
pies the leasehold, since then the tenant would be best able to provide protection. See
Comment, Torts--Landlord-Tenant Relations-Landlord has Duty to Take Reasonable Pre-
cautions to Protect his Tenants Against Criminal Acts of Third Parties-Kline v. 1500
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While this analysis does not necessarily demonstrate that there
should be no landlord liability if applied to acts of terrorism, it
does suggest that standards of duty should not be as strict as those
used in the residential context.27
D. Summary
The many different theories of recovery, formulations of negli-
gence, and definitions of foreseeability available to plaintiffs make
it difficult for landlords to both assess their liability for protecting
tenants and develop an appropriate response to that liability. Since
successful theories of recovery vary by jurisdiction and even by
court," if landlord liability for criminal acts were applied to acts
of terrorism, outcomes for victims would differ based on the loca-
tion of the terrorist's target. 29 This confusion has led some com-
mentators to note that regardless of Kline's admonition that they
are not insurers, landlords must in fact overprotect.' This over-
protection results in economic inefficiency and may prompt some
landlords to seek other investment opportunities altogether.' Fur-
thermore, the number of different theories available and reluctance
of courts to specifically define foreseeability decreases the chances
of judicially resolving a case at an early stage.' While current
Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 943, 951 n.53 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter Landlord-Tenant Relations].
127. A final difference between commercial and residential tenancies is that a business
expects customers and has employees. It has been assumed here that invitees, employees
of tenants, and tenants are treated in the same manner (i.e., entitled to the same protec-
tion). Indeed this seems to be the case in most jurisdictions. See Doyle v. Exxon, 592
F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding duty to protect employee of tenant); Ann M. v. Pacific
Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 212-13 (Cal. 1993) (stating that because the commer-
cial tenant generally is not a natural person and because it acts through its employees, "it
cannot be seriously asserted that a tort duty that a landlord owes to protect the personal
safety of its tenants should not extend to its tenant's employees"); Haines, supra note 34,
Landlord-Tenant Relations, supra note 126, at 950; Selvin, supra note 37, at 325. But see
Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975) (denying plaintiff-shopper's complaint
stressing both the absence of landlord-tenant relationship and that the case involved com-
mercial vs. residential property).
Under this assumption, standards of liability would theoretically not be affected by
the difference. A complete discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note,
therefore it is assumed for present purposes that invitees and employees of tenants are
treated in the same manner as tenants wherever possible. However, employees of tenants
will often be precluded from filing suit due to worker's compensation statutes. See supra
note 24.
128. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
129. While this is the case with many types of claims, it is particularly disturbing in
the context of terrorism where preventive measures seem most effective when conducted
based on a consistent national, if not international, scale. See infra notes 158-63 and
accompanying text.
130. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 761; supra notes 111-12.
131. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 773.
132. See id. at 707; supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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victim compensation statutes appear inadequate, the alternative of
landlord liability for criminal acts is subject to these significant
drawbacks. Especially when viewed in the context of commercial
leaseholds, current formulations of landlord liability will not pro-
vide the most efficient methods of victim compensation or in-
creased prevention when the crime in question is terrorism.
II. LANDOWNER LIABILrrY WHEN THE CRIME IS TERRORISM
Holding landlords liable for acts of terrorism raises issues
beyond those involved in landlord liability for more mundane crim-
inal acts. Topics more specific to terrorism that may affect the
determination of whether landlord liability is an appropriate legal
response can be divided into six categories: (1) defining terrorism;
(2) preventing terrorism; (3) warnings; (4) insurance; (5) mass
torts; and (6) evidentiary issues.' Further, by imposing liability
on landlords, society is really asking that they assume responsibili-
ty for preventing or protecting against terrorism. However, it is not
clear that tort remedies provide a cost-effective incentive to do so.
Finally, imposing liability on landlords may have extensive undesir-
able consequences, as landlords may not respond as desired. Exam-
ining these issues will support the hypothesis of the previous sec-
tion: landowner liability by itself is not the most appropriate legal
response to domestic terrorism.
A. Defining Terrorism
In terms of framing appropriate legal responses, a threshold
issue for legislatures and courts will be who gets to decide when
an act constitutes terrorism.'34 Certainly, in order to determine
whether landlord liability can be an effective preventive measure,
the behavior to be prevented must be defined. For purposes of this
Note, the term terrorism has generically been used to refer to
bombings-the type of act most likely to impact landowners.' It
133. One additional issue beyond the scope of this paper is the treatment of government
entities in their roles as landlords. As evidenced by the Oklahoma City bombing, govern-
ment buildings may often be the target of terrorist attacks. While there may be certain
filing or notification requirements specific to government landlords, it appears that there
are tenable arguments that there should be no difference between suing government and
private landlords, since the former are acting in a proprietary capacity. See Wise, supra
note 24, at 1. See generally, ATORNEY GENERAL'S ADVOCACY INSTrrtrE, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION SEMINAR (1990); IRVIN M. GOTLIEB &
PAUL H. GANrr, UNCLE SAM AS A LANDLORD UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
(1967).
134. For example, in other areas of the law, the success of a claim often depends, at
least in part, on who gets to define it; that is, whether an act results in the violation of
a federal statute (as defined in federal court) or in a breach of contract (as defined in
state court).
135. Cases brought as a result of terrorist bombings on airlines, such as the Pan Am
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seems, however, that no "one definition of terrorism has gained
universal acceptance," even the United Nations is unable to agree
on a definition.3 6 Whatever its definition, Americans have tradi-
tionally considered terrorism to be a matter for international law.
Americans think that if terrorism occurs in the United States, it
must have "come in" across borders.'37 Clearly though, as shown
by the Oklahoma City bombing, terrorist acts may be entirely
domestic. Further, the face of terrorism has changed over the past
two decades. Skyjackings and spectacular raids like the one at the
Munich Olympics have been replaced' by car bombs. 39 Based
on this analysis, the definition of terrorism will no doubt change as
both politics and technology change. One constant is that terrorists
have very different motivations from ordinary criminals; a terrorist
incident over Lockerbie, involve very different legal theories than those at issue here since
the standard for liability is outlined statutorily under the Warsaw Convention. See, e.g., In
re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994).
Other United States cases have involved acts that could be defined as terrorism, but do
not raise the same issues as the types of acts involving domestic landowners as contem-
plated here. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rela-
tives of Israelis killed in a PLO attack brought suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act);
New Market Investment Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa.
1991) (Chilean grapes laced with cyanide seized at customs). More random acts of retri-
bution not involving political overtones (e.g., acts committed by disgruntled employees and
sociopathic individuals) are also not addressed here. See, e.g., Douglas Waller & Tom
Morganthau, Caught by Surprise, NEWsWEEK, Mar. 8, 1993 at 28 (quoting Jerry Bremer,
the State Department's top counterterrorism official in the 1980s who commented after the
World Trade Center bombing, "[W]e shouldn't automatically [assume] this is the begin-
ning of a new world war .... It's entirely plausible that this is some disgruntled em-
ployee who's been fired."); cf Vmdavan v. Malcolm, No. 64839, 1994 WL 86225 (Ohio
Ct. App. March 17, 1994) (involving a lone gunman entering Cleveland public library at
noon and randomly shooting three people). Finally, a number of domestic cases use the
term "terrorism" or "terroristic" but really involve more ordinary, random criminal activity,
such as "terroristic threatening," which is a misdemeanor in some states. See, e.g., Parker
v. Norris, 859 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
136. Porras, supra note 6, at 125. See also Captain Bruce T. Smith, Assertion of Adju-
dicatory Jurisdiction by United States Courts Over International Terrorism Cases, ARMY
LAW., Oct. 1991, at 15 (noting that each state has advanced a different definition of the
term; in effect, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"). The term terror-
ism has therefore been held to be "Humpty Dumpty," or anything we want it to be. See
Porras, supra note 6, at 124; see also, R. Thackrah, Terrorism: A Definitional Problem, in
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON TERRORISM 24 (Paul Wilkenson & Alasdair M. Stewart
eds., 1987). A federal statute currently defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically moti-
vated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandes-
tine agents," usually intended to influence an audience. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (1994)
(prescribing annual country reports on terrorism by the Secretary of State). The United
States Department of Defense calls it "the unlawful use or threatened use of force or vio-
lence against individuals or property, with the intention of coercing or intimidating gov-
ernments or societies, often for political or ideological purposes." Smith, supra, at 15.
137. See Porras, supra note 6, at 144.
138. See Waller & Morganthau, supra note 135, at 28 (contending that the reason for
the change are intelligence agencies' increased abilities to monitor terrorist activities).
139. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
act is neither profit-motivated nor a random assault, it is usually
part of a larger plan,'" and is usually calculated for media effect.
If landlord liability for criminal acts is applied to terrorism, we are
effectively saying that these types of definitional differences do not
matter, although they must affect the kinds of preventive measures
that are effective."'
B. Preventing Terrorism
Just as in the context of criminal acts, making landlords liable
for terrorist acts really means that we want landlords to assist in
prevention or protection.'42 While in the criminal context structur-
al changes by landlords (e.g., alarms and lighting) are of prime im-
portance, most experts agree that structural changes by themselves
will not thwart a terrorist attack. As Richard Moore, an associate
director with FEMA, explained, "You can make a building less
susceptible to severe damage, but it's got to be done in concert
with other things-security for instance .. . ."" Experts agree
that the most effective counterterrorist measure is intelligence,
especially infiltration of terrorist organizations.' There are there-
fore three principal ways to prevent terrorist acts: structural chang-
es to buildings, private security changes, and government actions.
To determine whether landlords should be held liable, the effective-
ness of the first two must be evaluated. Based on the following
analysis, the argument for resting the primary burden of prevention
with governments rather than private landowners is even stronger
here than in the context of regular crime.
Attempting to prevent terrorism assumes that terrorist groups
act rationally; that is, they attempt to minimize costs and achieve
their own ideas of successful outcomes. Indeed, there is evidence
that terrorist groups respond to measures that raise the risks of a
particular type of attack.45 In this regard, while creating an abso-
lutely damage-proof building is both architecturally impossible and
prohibitively expensive, there are a number of ways to make build-
140. See Ayaz R. Shaikh, A Theoretic Approach to Transnational Terrorism, 80 GEO.
LJ. 2133, 2174 n.15 (1992).
141. And further, they should affect who we want to have define (courts vs. legisla-
tures) the behavior that constitutes terrorism. A case-by-case development of a definition
in the courts would seem destined to perpetuate the unpredictability and inequity currently
associated with foreseeability.
142. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
143. Greenberger, supra note 8, at Al.
144. "If you want to counter terrorism, 80 percent is a matter of getting good intelli-
gence. . . .You can fiddle around with the other 20 percent all you want, but in terms
of prevention, intelligence is the key." Masland et al., supra note 7, at 56-57 (quoting L.
Paul Bremer, who headed President Reagan's counterterrorism office).
145. See Shaikh, supra note 140, at 2134.
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ings more resistant to "human evil."'" Various structural modifi-
cations include imposing setbacks,'47 preventing flying glass,'"
and infrastructure supports.' 49 Structural changes are not cheap,
however, and in fact may increase dangers for other perils (e.g.,
fire).'5 Changes of a preventive rather than protective nature, like
restricting access and using camera surveillance are more practi-
cal.'5'
For what has been called "the most terrible weapon in a
terrorist's arsenal"' 2-the car bomb-adequate preventive mea-
sures may not exist. Robert Kupperman, a terrorism expert at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, noted
that car bombs are a "throw away" weapon requiring little planning
or support and fewer participants than the more traditional terrorist
acts. '53 A munitions expert who formerly worked with the CIA
noted that very few places in the United States are protected from
car bomb attacks. "People in the intelligence community have been
warning for years that this kind of thing could come to the United
States .... And in the United States, we have bigger cars than
they do in Europe."'' 4 Indeed, it seems the simplest of terrorist
146. Mark A. Hofmann, Perils an Impossible Task, Bus. INS., June 12, 1995, at 3.
147. "The critical thing is to keep the weapons as far from the building as possible, by
imposing some setbacks." Id. (quoting Eve Hinman, security analyst with Failure Analysis
Associates). Examples of setbacks include pop-up bollards, such as pipes filled with con-
crete that can be recessed to street level and raised when needed to restrict vehicular
traffic. See id.
148. "In a bomb attack, generally speaking, the primary sources of both property dam-
age and bodily injury is flying glass." Id. (quoting Ron Massa, president of Loron Corp.,
a high-tech security consultant, who also noted that a 1993 Irish Republican Army bomb-
ing in London showered the surrounding area with 700 tons of shattered glass). After the
Oklahoma City bombing, more than 400 buildings in the area had glass broken and about
75% of the people injured were hurt by flying glass. See Hofmann, supra note 146, 148,
at 3; see also Leslie Scism & Joe Davidson, Insurance Losses in Oklahoma Bombing
Seen Topping Several Hundred Million, WALL ST. J. May 4, 1995, at A4. Preventive
measures include installing laminated glass, like that used in cars. Hofmann, supra note
146, at 3.
149. Bombs, for example, produce enormous vertical thrust capable of "peeling roofs
right off like a sardine can," requiring that they essentially be tied down. Hofmann, supra
note 146, at 3. As opposed to retro-fitting buildings for restricting access, structural hard-
ening is much more difficult, is costly, and is of questionable effectiveness. The Oklaho-
ma City bombing made us all familiar with the structural concerns present in trying to
protect against a bomb blast. See id.
150. See id. For example, security bars on windows can hamper a tenant's escape from
a burning building.
151. "I think the answer has to be in the prevention area as opposed to protection." Id.
(quoting Fred Deacon, highly respected risk engineering manager for Kemper Insurance).
152. Christopher Dickey, Car Bombs: A Potent Weapon of Fear, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8,
1993, at 29.
153. See Waller & Morganthau, supra note 135, at 28.
154. Dickey, supra note 152, at 29; see also Sunday Today, (NBC television broadcast,
Jan. 7, 1996) (interviewing Brian Jenkins, a terrorism expert who noted a trend discernible
in the 1990's toward the increasing incidence of large-scale indiscriminate violence exem-
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plots and weapons can foil the most sophisticated security. Security
at the Olympic games in Atlanta involved more than 30,000 police
and security experts, more than 2,000 explosives experts, 40 bomb-
sniffing dogs, 1,000 video cameras, 200,000 I.D. badges, 100 com-
puterized command centers, and microchips that stored digital im-
ages of the bearer's palmprint; all at a cost of over $117 mil-
lion.5 The security teams in Atlanta had practiced against a re-
lease of nerve gas, a massive bomb attack inside the games, and a
plane hijacking, but were unable to protect visitors from a crude
pipe-bomb left unattended in a bag.'56
A further problem with preventive measures is that they serve
to merely relocate criminal behavior. For example, while fortifica-
tion of diplomatic facilities has resulted in a decrease of known
terrorist missions aimed at them, incidences of assassinations and
hostage-takings outside protected facilities against civilians has
increased.'57 This substitution phenomenon suggests that all land-
owners would have to continually refine structural and procedural
security to thwart terrorists ready to relocate or develop new tactics
in order for preventive measures to be effective. This highlights the
need for more retaliatory or interventionist measures by govern-
ment.
Experts believe that the preferred way to prevent terrorism is
to "identify and break up terrorist cells, possibly expel or prevent
the entry of individual terrorists and thwart their plans."'5 8 The
FBI, which has the primary responsibility for counterterrorism
measures in the United States,59 perceives that counterterrorism is
still a "growing field" and has transferred a number of agents from
counterintelligence to that area."6  One question raised after the
Oklahoma City bombing was whether any free society could ever
prevent terrorist acts.' As Fred Moore of FEMA noted, "I don't
plified by car bombs).
155. See James Adams & Maurice Chittenden, 18-Minute Countdown To Carnage, SUN-
DAY TIMES (London), July 28, 1996, § 1, at 2.
156. See id.
157. Shaikh, supra note 140, at 2141-42. In 1990, for example, "hard" targets (military,
government, and diplomatic) accounted for 25% of attacks, businesses and other targets
accounted for 75%. See id. at 2142 n.42 (citing UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
PATrEnNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1990 37 (1991).
158. Howard M. Shapiro, The FBI in the 21st Century, Address at the Cornell Law
School (Oct. 18, 1994), in 28 CORNELL. INT'L. L.J. 219, 223 (1995); see also James Q.
Wilson, The Case for Greater Vigilance, TIME, May 1, 1995, at 73 ("Terrorist
groups ... are best attacked by infiltration. This means either planting an undercover
agent in their midst or recruiting one of their members as an informant. This is the job
of the FBI.").
159. See Shapiro, supra note 158, at 223.
160. See id.
161. See Wilson, supra note 158, at 73.
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think any government, even the most authoritarian, has found a
way to eliminate terrorism."'1 62 Indeed, even though the Oklahoma
City tragedy appears wholly domestic, it seems likely that many
acts of terrorism within the United States will be perpetrated by
those who come from outside the country or flee the country after-
wards. Without a unified international effort, or at least consensus
on means of deterrence and agreement to accept the costs that a
global antiterrorism strategy would entail, efforts by agencies of
any one nation seem destined to be reactive.6 3 These comments
suggest that at the least a national policy, rather than the state-by-
state approach inherent in landlord tort liability, is warranted.
Many of the same concerns about the effectiveness of private
citizens as compared to government in preventing regular crime
apply in the terrorism context. The differences noted above-that
structural changes are even less effective but more costly, and that
there is a greater necessity for national if not international govern-
ment intervention-reinforce the conclusion that landlord liability as
a method of increasing terrorism prevention should be restricted.
C. Warnings
In addition to intervention, the term "prevention" as used here
is assumed to include protection, or measures designed to lessen
the damage caused by terrorist attacks. One way of protecting
tenants and invitees is to require landlords to warn them about
terrorist threats received. The question of whether mere warnings
about the risk of crime (or terrorism) on the premises could ever
be sufficient to avoid liability has not been addressed by litigation.
Theoretically at least, warnings themselves could be an adequate
security measure in response to lower levels of foreseeable terror-
ism. However, if warnings would be sufficient, there may still be a
question about whether it would be equitable or efficient to require
landlords to issue them. Disclosure of terrorist threats is not an
easy issue as there are several competing concerns in a determina-
tion of when to notify tenants or customers. Disclosure could theo-
retically reduce lawsuits if the threat is carried out, but could hurt
business if it is not. Disclosure can encourage public dialogue that
can help law enforcement--or encourage copycats. For example,
after the World Trade Center bombing there were seventy bomb
threats a day in New York City." The classic "boy who cries
wolf' syndrome creates a risk that real threats will be ignored. 65
162. Greenberger, supra note 8, at Al.
163. See, e.g., Shaikh, supra note 140, at 2134.
164. See James Rainey, Threats of Terrorism: When to Tell the Public, L.A. TIMES,
July 4, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 2062176.
165. See id.
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Finally, however, there are advantages to public notification in that
citizens can help with prevention. For example, British officials in
particular were dependent upon citizens to help spot IRA
bombs.'6
If a landlord guesses incorrectly and does not issue a warning,
certainly issues of notice and reasonable response are implicat-
ed. 67 For example, over Easter weekend in 1995, Disneyland re-
ceived a threat that a chemical attack would take place. 61 Dis-
neyland officials decided not to warn visitors, but did summon
health officials and a chemical warfare team before the FBI deter-
mined it was a hoax. 69 If something had gone wrong that week-
end, Disneyland would have been faced with the prospect of de-
fending its decision not to warn customers in front of an unsympa-
thetic jury. The best solution to this problem may be to statutorily
establish that landowners have a duty to inform the appropriate
government authority if they are aware of any risks. The authority
can then make a determination about any necessary warnings. In
that way private landowners have a clear role in prevention, while
determinations about public policy are left to the experts.
D. Issues from the World Trade Center Bombing Litigation
The civil litigation following the World Trade Center bombing
provides examples of some of the more detailed legal issues likely
to arise when landlord liability is applied to acts of terrorism. An
examination of some of these concerns (namely, insurance, mass
tort, and evidentiary issues) reinforce the conclusion that this type
of litigation, which requires massive amounts of resources to pur-
sue, will not likely provide an efficient legal response to domestic
terrorism.
1. Insurance
Since the targets of terrorist attacks are likely to be commer-
cial leaseholds, and since commercial leaseholds generally carry
insurance, litigation following a terrorist act will likely consist of a
166. See id.
167. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. For example, while the United
States Department of Transportation is now required to assess the safety of foreign air-
ports and issue warnings when they do not meet safety standards, airlines themselves
decide what, if anything, to tell passengers about known threats. Many airline officials
feel compelled to disclose threats because of litigation following the Pan Am Lockerbie
incident, where juries awarded almost $40 million to plaintiffs for Pan Am's failure to
take proper precautions. A terrorist bomb downed Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland in 1988. Travelers on the flight were not informed that terrorists had threatened
several flights, like Flight 103, that had originated in Frankfurt, Germany.
168. See Rainey, supra note 164, at 1.
169. See id.
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battle between insurance companies. Insurers of tenants will attempt
to subrogate claims that they have been forced to pay, probably by
alleging that either the policyholder or someone else (i.e., the land-
lord) was negligent. 7 For example, in the World Trade Center
litigation, one insurance company, Phoenix Assurance, is seeking to
recoup a $5-10 million payout on a property and business interrup-
tion policy for Teleport Communications Group, Inc., a World
Trade Center tenant. A lawyer for Phoenix Assurance notes,
"Insurance companies have an obligation to policyholders and
shareholders to minimize their losses.. 7' In fact, insurance com-
panies with significant claims are well represented among the re-
maining plaintiffs in the World Trade Center litigation.'" Of
course, having insurance companies involved as final litigants first
requires that they have decided to honor policyholders' claims."7
When claims are significant,'74 insurers may try to avoid
them under any number of exceptions to coverage. For example,
insurers might try to argue that a terrorist bombing is not a cov-
ered "occurrence" because it was technically not an accident but a
deliberate act. Theoretically, this type of maneuvering should not
be successful, "as the use of the term 'accident' was [not] intended
to deprive policyholders of coverage for deliberate acts of violence
against them by unknown third parties."'75 A more likely tactic
when damages from a terrorist attack are at issue may be for insur-
ers to claim refuge under a "war risk exclusion." The war risk
exclusion generally bars coverage for damages resulting from "war,
invasion, civil war, revolution, insurrection or warlike operations,
whether there be a declaration of war or not." 76 In practice, this
exclusion has generally been limited to actions taken by hostile
170. See Pacelle, supra note 3, at B1. One New York insurance lawyer notes that
"[i]nsurance companies do not pay any large losses without a fight. I call it insurance
nullification by litigation." Id.
171. Id. (quoting Phoenix Assurance lawyer Blair Fensterstock).
172. See, e.g., Wise, supra note 2, at I (noting that one firm represents 20 insurance
companies seeking to recover over $75 million in claims).
173. For damage attributable to a terrorist attack, any number of policies might apply.
Direct physical damage to insured property as a result of fire, smoke, or vibrations is
generally covered by a property policy. Indirect losses resulting from a tenant's loss of
use of their property may be covered by either a property or business interruption policy.
General liability policies should cover tenants for damages they may incur because of
damage to a third party (e.g., if a customer's business is interrupted because of the terror-
ist act). See Rhonda D. Orin, Insurance May Provide Glimmer of Light for Darkened
World Trade Center Businesses, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 10, 1993, at 1.
174. Using the World Trade Center bombing as an example, indirect losses alone can
often be significant. New York City officials have estimated that companies and govern-
ment agencies could lose $692 million if the World Trade Center was closed for a week.
See id.
175. Id. at 7.
176. Id. at 6.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
government entities or attempts to overthrow government enti-
ties." For example, at least one insurance company has tried,
albeit without success, to argue that the war risk exclusion should
preclude coverage for damages resulting from a hijacking.' Fur-
ther, should insurance companies attempt to assert an exclusion,
they generally have the burden of proof to show why coverage
should not apply.179 Specifically with regard to the World Trade
Center, shortly after the bombing, two of the biggest carriers in the
property and business-disruption fields took different positions on
whether the war risk exclusion would apply in that instance.'80 In
many European countries, insurance policies now include specific
terrorism exclusions, however, the World Trade Center's policies
did not.''
Given that insurance companies for tenants injured by a terror-
ist act will most likely have to honor claims for property loss,
business interruption, and general liability,' it is likely that they
will attempt to subrogate claims via litigation. As insurance compa-
nies undoubtedly have the resources to be powerful plaintiffs, com-
mercial landlords whose properties have been the site of terrorist
attacks will likely be harder pressed to defend themselves against
allegations of negligence than their residential counterparts whose
tenants' losses may often be uninsured.
2. Mass Torts
Due to the nature of the terrorist attacks contemplated, a great
number of plaintiffs will be involved in subsequent litigation
against landlords for a given incident. In the wake of the World
177. See id.
178. See Orin, supra note 173, at 1. The court, in Pan American World Airways v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974), relied on the fact that Pan
Am was covered by an "all risk" policy, where all risks not excluded are automatically
included.
179. See Orin, supra note 173, at 1 (citing Emons Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 545 F. Supp. 185, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("New York law places the burden of proof
upon the insurance company to show any exclusions.")).
180. Hartford said that there should be no problem with coverage because under its
policies the exclusion only applies if war has been declared. Aetna argued that it was too
soon to say how the exclusion would be applied. See Wise, supra note 24, at 1. The
spokesperson for Hartford said that standard clauses (in this case coverage exclusions for
damage attributable to "insurrection and acts of war") are recommended to the industry by
the Insurance Services Office, a trade organization, and that each company has its own
interpretation of such language. Id.
181. See William B. Bice, Comment, British Government Reinsurance and Acts of Ter-
rorism: The Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 441, 448 n.39 (1994)
(stating that the World Trade Center provides an ideal example of a no-exclusion policy).
Should incidences of domestic terrorism continue, it may not be long until domestic insur-
ers covering U.S. commercial risks attempt to use terrorism exclusions as well.
182. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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Trade Center bombing, an eight-firm steering committee was ap-
pointed to direct the litigation of the 170 civil actions filed.'
For purposes of judicial economy (if not ecology)," 4 it makes
sense to litigate all the World Trade Center claims simultaneously.
It is also important to ask, however, whether there will be any
undesirable side-effects to doing so.
For example, in more typical class action cases," 5 concerns
arise as to whether the focus will shift from client to lawyer, from
damages to attorney's fees, and from litigation to settlement. Apart
from saving costs, which primarily benefit the defendant, it is
probably to the plaintiffs' advantage to have the cases consolidated,
since their claims will tend to reinforce each other. 86 Apparently,
in this case the Port Authority thought that the cost of litigating all
the claims separately would far outweigh any such intangible bene-
fit gained by the plaintiffs. As long as these types of concerns of
both defendants and plaintiffs can be managed efficiently, which
remains to be seen in the World Trade Center litigation, perhaps
the fact that terrorist acts will create mass tort litigation is not a
significant problem, at least as to its effect on the substantive law.
183. See Today's News Update, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 2, 1994, at 1. The World Trade Center
cases were consolidated on June 4, 1994 upon a motion of the Port Authority which
argued that (1) the claims all involved Port Authority's liability; (2) the salient facts in-
volved (place, date, time) were the same in every case; (3) the fact that there were some
issues of law and fact that were not common should not defeat the motion to consolidate
since there was at least one important issue of law/substantial fact in common; and (4)
consolidation would avoid unnecessary duplication of trials, save unnecessary costs and ex-
pense, and prevent injustice resulting from divergent decisions based on the same facts.
See Green & Tripathi, supra note 1, at 48-49.
184. As Justice Sklar noted in the course of the first conference of the World Trade
Center litigation, "We have to have coordination to avoid wasting your time and my
time, . . . [f]ailure to organize . . . would be anti-ecological .. " Wise, supra note 2,
at 1.
185. Courts have avoided the use of class actions for "mass accidents," perhaps largely
because of differences between plaintiffs' injuries or damages. See Jenkins v. Raymark
Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (allowing certification of a class action for
asbestos claims).
186. In the World Trade Center litigation, of the roughly 114 lawyers representing the
661 claimants, only four objected to the creation of the committee, and they will manage
their cases separately. See Today's News Update, supra note 183, at 1. The lawyer lead-
ing the committee, Blair Fensterstock, represents Phoenix Assurance Co., one of the insur-
ance companies attempting to subrogate claims related to the blast. See Wise, supra note
2, at 1, 5; see also supra note 9 (discussing the types of claims filed). In making recom-
mendations for the committee, Fensterstock acknowledged that it is not always easy to
please the variety of plaintiffs. For example, some lawyers with personal injury claims are
concerned that their clients' interests might get lost if the committee is dominated by
lawyers representing commercial clients. See Wise, supra note 2, at 5.
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3. Evidentiary Issues
In attempting to hold landlords liable for terrorist acts, some
interesting evidentiary issues may develop. For example, in the
wake of the bombing, the World Trade Center has undertaken
significant additional structural modifications and security proce-
dures.187 It does not appear to have been addressed yet, but one
question may be whether the plaintiffs can introduce evidence of
these subsequent remedial measures to attempt to prove that the
Port Authority either knew that existing security was inadequate or
that alternate cost-effective safety measures were available. The
New York equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which
excludes "evidence of the subsequent [remedial] measures...
offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct"'88 would be at
issue. As the Federal rule itself notes, however, it "does not require
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility
of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment."'
89
Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys will likely find a way to get evidence of
the modifications admitted.
Another evidentiary issue that will undoubtedly arise in terror-
ism cases against landlords, and indeed has arisen in the World
Trade Center litigation, involves whether discovery of previously
conducted security studies should be allowed. Plaintiffs in the
World Trade Center bombing case requested that the Port Authority
turn over some sixty-two documents that relate to security audits of
the complex conducted in the mid-1980s.' 9 The Port Authority
has resisted production of the materials on grounds that the docu-
ments "are subject to the public interest privilege and/or that they
contain information which is neither material nor necessary in the
prosecution of the action."' 9' Discovery of the security reports is
187. See supra note 7.
188. FED. R. EVID. 407. New York state courts do not follow the Federal Rules of
Evidence, but they do follow a common law rule which holds that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is not admissible at trial to prove the negligence or culpable conduct
of a defendant. See Particia A. Brass, Federal Rule of Evidence 407: Should It Apply to
Products Liability, 11 TotRO L. REv. 253, 280 (1994).
189. FED. R. EviD. 407.
190. See Matter of World Trade Center Bombing Cases, N.Y. L., Apr. 14, 1995, at
26.
191. Id. "The public interest privilege applies to 'confidential communications between
public officers, and to public officers, in the performance of their duties, where the public
interest requires that such confidential communications or their sources should not be di-
vulged."' Id. (quoting Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 316 N.E.2d 301, 303 (N.Y. 1974)).
While perhaps limited to quasi-governmental agencies like the Port Authority, many of the
policy arguments presented by the public interest privilege issue are likely to be raised in
admissibility questions generally. For example, in arguing against discovery of the docu-
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a key issue for the plaintiffs since they allegedly contain comments
like "the vulnerability of the World Trade Center to the terrorist is
substantial .... It is an extremely inviting target," and that the
parking garage "presents an enormous opportunity at present for a
terrorist to park an explosive filled vehicle that could affect vulner-
able areas."'" The same reports also allegedly contain specific
recommendations to tighten security, including closer monitoring of
the garage, and banning all public parking. The lawsuit filed by
Phoenix Assurance alleges that "as far as we can tell, [the reports
were] almost entirely ignored."'93 In attempting to establish that
the Port Authority was negligent in failing to protect tenants from
the bombing, the plaintiffs are attempting to show that the Port
Authority was aware of security problems and did not respond
reasonably to them. Plaintiffs' attorneys are therefore also undertak-
ing discovery by seeking testimony of consultants and Port Author-
ity employees who might have been aware of the risk. 94
As noted above, the plaintiffs claimed that the documents
should be produced since they are relevant to Port Authority's
recklessness (or knowledge) and foreseeability In response, the
ments on this basis, the Port Authority emphasized that in preparing the reports, employ-
ees consulted with the "FBI, CIA, the National Security Agency, the Department of De-
fense, Scotland Yard, and intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of Israel, France,
Switzerland, and Italy," and claimed that revealing the contents of the report would dis-
courage such cooperation in the future. Matter of World Trade Center Bombing Cases,
supra note 190, at 26. Further, the Port Authority argued that the documents should not
be revealed because they contained information which could adversely affect security if
used by a "person intending to engage in activity injurious to persons and property at the
World Trade Center...I. Id. Finally, the Port Authority argued that the plaintiffs would
not be foreclosed from establishing that their injuries resulted from Port Authority's lack
of due care since they could go to other sources (e.g., expert testimony) to establish
negligence. See id. at 27.
The plaintiffs responded that the public interest privilege should be construed narrow-
ly because: (1) the public interest privilege would not apply to a private landlord in this
instance, a fortiori it should not be applied here; and (2) the Port Authority failed to
show how revealing the security reports would inhibit communication. See id. at 26. They
also alleged that the public interest would be better served if the documents were dis-
closed because the revelation of the Port Authority's vulnerabilities would force it to take
remedial measures, and that even if privilege applies, all of the Port Authority's concerns
could be met via use of a confidentiality order. See id. at 26-27.
The judge ordered an in camera review of the documentation in order to determine
whether it should be privileged. See Matter of World Trade Center Bombing Cases, supra
note 190, at 27. He is expected to decide which security reports the plaintiffs may re-
ceive in September, 1996. See Feiden, supra note 59, at 36.
192. Pacelle, supra note 3, at BIO.
193. Id.
194. See Wise, supra note 2, at 5. This may raise an interesting agency question: when
could a landlord be considered to have constructive knowledge of the risks? However, this
question is beyond the scope of this Note. In this case, since the reports were apparently
prepared for the Port Authority's executive director, it seems clear that the Port Authority
would be considered to have constructive knowledge.
195. See Matter of the World Trade Center Cases, supra note 190, at 26. Also, as dis-
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Port Authority argued that since the explosion occurred on a
sublevel, any information about a safety system, device, or practice
occurring at or above the concourse level is irrelevant."% The
judge dismissed the Port Authority's argument, holding that "[tihe
mere fact that the explosion occurred in a level beneath the con-
course does not necessarily render irrelevant the documents...
relating to the concourse or floors above the concourse."'9 7 Fur-
ther, he noted that "the PA may assert as a defense that, while
numerous recommendations were made, it was unable to take all of
the recommended steps because of, inter alia, cost and that there-
fore it had to prioritize the implementation of them."'98 The judge
warned that by asserting such a defense-that it acted reasonably
and with due care in following the reports and implementing rec-
ommendations found therein-the Port Authority could then be
compelled to produce the documents.'
While the public interest privilege may be specific to a quasi-
governmental agency like the Port Authority, many of the rele-
vance and policy issues noted could easily arise in a completely
private setting. For example, though not raised by the Port Authori-
ty, other relevancy arguments could include whether the type of
harm is not specifically addressed by the security report, the securi-
ty report is out-of-date, or even that the contents of the report
would likely cause the jury to be prejudiced against the defendant.
Finally, defendants are likely to make the policy argument that the
admissibility of security reports may actually constitute a
disincentive to conduct them in the first place. Therefore, evidentia-
ry issues specific to terrorism will require significant resources and
add another layer of complexity to an already complex area of
litigation.
E. The Effects of Finding Landlords Liable
All of the problems endemic to terrorism discussed above
suggest that imposing liability on landowners is not an efficient
mechanism for increased prevention. Further, imposing liability on
landowners may have some unintended, potentially negative effects
because landowners may not respond as desired. Such unintended
consequences may be divided into five categories: (1) landowners
cussed above, Dean Witter alleges that the Port Authority misrepresented security in lease
negotiations, so that evidence of the Port Authority's knowledge is necessary in proving
its claims of fraud. See id.
196. See id. at 27.
197. Id.
198. Id. The judge cited Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451, 458 n.8 (N.Y.
1980), for the proposition that the jury may take into account the cost of the safety mea-
sures in determining the reasonableness of the safety measures. See id.
199. See id.
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may not respond to liability with increased security; (2) landowners
may even treat liability as a disincentive to engage in further secu-
rity measures; (3) landowners may use liability as justification for
impinging on tenants' rights; (4) landowners may shift resources to
other investments (unintended macroeconomic consequences); and
(5) landowners may attempt to shift the risk of liability to other
parties.
1. Liability as Incentive
In determining whether landowner liability will result in in-
creased protection against terrorist attacks, beyond the analysis of
which preventive measures may be effective against terrorism,2"
an examination of whether landowner liability has resulted in in-
creased security measures against regular criminal acts may be
helpful. Commentators have argued both for and against liability
under tort law as an effective deterrent (or incentive). For example,
one author argues that finding landlords liable for protecting ten-
ants and invitees has induced landlords to make "considerable
efforts" to render their buildings negligence-proof, if not crime-
proof, by hiring extra lobby personnel and security guards, and
improving lighting."1 Further, apparently due to liability expo-
sure, almost every major fast food company has recently hired a
security director and over the past ten years these companies' secu-
rity budgets have approximately doubled.2"
The same author notes that tort law as a deterrent is only
moderately successful, and questions whether deterrence benefits
outweigh the costs imposed. °3 For example, it is unclear whether
imposing liability on landlords actually prevents crime overall or
merely serves to relocate it.2" Many commentators also point out
the social costs, including potential violations of tenants' rights,
and increased chances for corruption, discriminatory enforcement,
and vigilantism, which could result from the deputization of the
citizenry and the fact that law enforcement essentially becomes
private."' For example, from 1969 to 1990 the value of private
200. See supra notes 142-63 and accompanying text.
201. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 416 (1994).
202. See id.
203. See id. at 444.
204. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 773.
205. See id.; see also Kaufman, supra note 15, at 109 n.24 ("The police function is
highly specialized, involving skills and training which the government alone can provide.
There is no room for the private devices of frontier days."); infra notes 211-224 and
accompanying text (discussing potential violations of tenants' rights that could result). But
see Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE LJ. 698, 709 n.70 (1986) (arguing
that "there is little danger that imposing liability will cause [security officers] to become
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security industries rose from $2.5 million to $18 billion annually
and the number of employees increased from fewer than 300,000
to nearly two million.' Currently private security personnel out-
number police by more than two to one, but are largely unregis-
tered and usually not as well trained. 7
Despite these concerns, and while it seems unfair to find that
a person is entitled to more protection from a landowner than from
police, business and industry do have the financial and technical
resources available for aiding the prevention of crime 8 (or ter-
rorism). It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that while im-
posing liability on landlords does provide a moderate incentive to
increase crime prevention, such incentive must be evaluated on a
cost-benefit basis. For terrorism, this analysis suggests that the
preventive measures that landlords can take by applying private
resources seem to be less cost-effective than the measures that
government can take by applying public resources.
2. Liability as Disincentive
The propensity for liability to act as a disincentive is perhaps
most apparent under the voluntary assumption of duty theory of
liability.' In the commercial context, this type of liability would
likely be triggered frequently since a large percentage of commer-
cial landowners provide some level of security. For example, as-
sume that there are two landlords who both can foresee that at
some point there will probably be a terrorist act upon one of their
tenants (e.g., each leases to an abortion clinic). One landlord
chooses to ignore various threats, while one hires a security guard
in response. When tenants or their invitees ultimately suffer inju-
ries, under the voluntary assumption of duty theory, the landlord
who hired the security guard is more likely to be found to have a
duty and will probably face a jury to defend the reasonableness of
his conduct.210 Under this analysis, it is hard to see why any
landlord would initially take what is undoubtedly the safer course,
vigilantes or 'officious intermeddlers' into private affairs").
206. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 785.
207. See id. In the context of terrorism, private security firms have initiated specializa-
tion in "crises response" services to respond to "acts of violence ... directed at a com-
pany, governmental agency or individuals . ." WACKEU CORPORATION CRISIS RE-
SPONSE SERVICES BROCHURE (on file with author).
208. See Kaufman, supra note 15, at 112 n.106 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT, REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOcIETY 35, 289
(1967)); Zacharias, supra note 205, at 709 ('The government's general responsibility for
law enforcement does not eliminate the business's separate duty to supplement public
compensation and public protection.").
209. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
210. This passage is based loosely on the "two restaurants" example in Adler, supra
note 50, at 884.
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since he would be, at best, in the same position as his counterpart
who did nothing-facing a potentially hostile jury to defend his
conduct. On the other hand, if the landlord does not provide secu-
rity, he still has not eliminated risk. Without empirical data, it is
difficult to gauge disincentive effects. However, it seems reasonable
to conclude that if not a disincentive, the incentive effects of tort
liability in this context are often muted.
3. Effects of Landlord Liability on Tenants' Rights
As one commentator has noted, it is perhaps "axiomatic" that
"as a landlord's duty to protect ... tenants increases, so too the
landlord's right to screen, control and evict tenants increases."'
Some of the implications of this doctrine are raised in Samson v.
Saginaw Professional Building, Inc.,22 where the Michigan Su-
preme Court upheld a finding of liability against a landlord for a
criminal act committed by a patient of a tenant mental health clinic
against an employee of another tenant. While the court did not
specify how landlords should deal with such high risk tenants,23
the court did seem to imply that a landlord has some responsibility
to assess the risks caused by tenants.214 This prompted one com-
mentator to caution, "There is a difference, however, between re-
quiring a landlord to act once a dangerous condition becomes
apparent, and encouraging him to discriminate against certain ten-
ants based on their prior records, their occupations, or the types of
invitees they may be expected to attract. Samson appears to do the
latter." 1 In another instance, a court upheld a landlord's right to
refuse the tenancy of an ex-convict, noting that "[iun choosing his
tenants, a landlord has a legitimate interest in protecting his proper-
ty, and an interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of
his other tenants. He may consider any criteria, but especially
criteria relevant to these ends. 2 6
Encouraging this type of behavior among landlords, especially
in the application of liability to terrorism, would seem to invite
discrimination against unpopular organizations. Indeed, this contro-
versy recently arose in New York, where a judge ruled that a
landlord could break an abortion clinic's lease "if his purpose is to
211. Glesner, supra note 29, at 762.
212. 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975); see also supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text
(discussing the "special relationship" theory of liability).
213. See Haines, supra note 34, at 344 (noting that "the majority opinion gives little
guidance on this problem").
214. See Samson, 224 N.W.2d at 849 (stating that "if the risk of death or serious bodi-
ly injury to a number of persons, the law requires that some care be exercised even
though the probability is slight that the incident will occur").
215. Haines, supra note 34, at 345.
216. Collins v. AAA Homebuilders, 333 S.E.2d 792, 793 (W. Va. 1985).
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protect other tenants against security risks arising from the clinic's
presence in his . . . building."217 The landlord based the eviction
on the clinic's failure to follow his regulations, which were de-
signed to prevent the clinic from performing abortions. The judge
found the landlord's regulations to be reasonable, holding that "[a]
landlord must exercise reasonable care to protect its tenants against
any foreseeable dangers."2 I" The judge's ruling, which never men-
tions the word abortion, cites seventeen incidents that were "direct-
ly related" to the abortion clinic, including gunshots, assaults on
employees, rocks thrown at clinic windows, smashed cars, a false
bomb scare, a tenant's doors glued shut, and the anonymous post-
ing of a threatening note that read in part "[ylou risk injury or
death if you are caught near these premises."219 The ruling al-
lowed the landlord to start eviction proceedings against the clinic,
even though it had eight years left on its lease and was not in
default of rent.'
Negative reaction against the decision was swift and raised
many of the civil rights concerns that result from imposing a duty
to protect on landlords in this context. For example, Rep. Charles
Schumer (D-Brooklyn) noted: "It's an open invitation to the ex-
tremist fringe in the pro-life movement to harass and intimidate
landlords until they evict clinics."' Priscilla Smith, attorney for
Center for Reproductive Law & Policy, stressed that "[s]aying the
clinic created an unsafe environment is the same as saying
that, 'We can't have Jewish people in our neighborhood because
we can't have people coming here and burning crosses.'
It's an easy way of trying to hide your discriminatory ac-
tions."'' And Donna Lieberman, attorney with the New York
Civil Liberties Union noted:
217. N.Y. Judge's Decision Turns Tenants Into Victims, NEWSDAY, Nov. 1, 1995, at
A28. (citing Long Island Gynecological Services, P.C. v. 1103 Stewart Ave. Associates
Ltd. Partnership, No. 4890-95, 1995 WL 686571 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1995), rev'd,
638 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)). The Appellate Division has now enjoined the
landlord from evicting the clinic pending the outcome of the appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals. See Today's News Update, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 15, 1995, at 115.
218. John T. McQuiston, Justice in Nassau Says Landlord May Evict Abortion Clinic,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at BI, B4. The landlord first told the clinic in January that
they could no longer perform abortions, but then, after consulting with his attorney, re-
vised the regulations to prohibit "tenants from 'engaging in any activity which, in and of
itself, jeopardizes the safety or property of other tenants."' Id.
219. McQuiston, supra note 218, at B1; see also Peterson, Abortion Clinic Can Get
Boot, Sez Judge, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 31, 1995, at 21 (noting that protesters also often
aggressively confronted patients and staff, and sometimes other tenants of the building by
mistake); New York: Judge Allows Abortion Clinic Eviction, in ABORTION REPORT, Oct.
31, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter ABORTION REPORT].
220. See Peterson, supra note 219, at 21.
221. Id.
222. ABORTION REPORT, supra note 219, at 1.
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[T]he court has approved a landlord's effort to evict a ten-
ant because the landlord failed to secure the safety of the
building for the tenant, which is a basic landlord obliga-
tion.... There was never any showing that the perfor-
mance of abortions presented any danger to the security of
the building.'
Finally, stressing contractual rather than public policy consider-
ations, David Rosenberg, a Manhattan lawyer, noted:
I would hope that commercial tenants' groups would rally
behind this tenant. If it stands up, then a lease has almost
no meaning for a tenant .... It's a contract. The tenant
hasn't violated it. And the tenant has a right to expect to
continue to operate according to the original contract. 4
4. Macroeconomic Consequences-Risk Shifting
Besides inviting tenants' rights violations, imposing a duty to
provide security on landlords may prove to be economically inequi-
table to some controversial tenants. Theoretically, landlords leasing
to more expensive stores can pass on the added cost of security to
customers, but businesses catering to a lower-income clientele may
not necessarily be able to do so without losing customers who are
more sensitive to prices than security.' This could ultimately
cause smaller or marginally profitable landlords, especially with
high-risk or controversial tenants, to leave the commercial real
estate market for more lucrative investments.2
Short of leaving the market, some landlords may respond to
liability for criminal/terrorist acts on their premises by simply re-
fusing to provide security and disclaiming all responsibility for
security-perhaps by informing prospective tenants that security is
their own responsibility. This does not, however, eliminate the risk
of liability if crime/terrorism, is found to be foreseeable; a more
prudent alternative available to landowners would be to attempt to
modify tort liability by shifting risk back to tenantsY7 Including
223. McQuiston, supra note 218, at B1, B4.
224. Id.
225. See Sharp, supra note 23, at 51 (arguing that in the private context the "free mar-
ket is better at allocating security resources").
226. See Glesner, supra note 29, at 773; Haines, supra note 34, at 351 (both discussing
this principle as applied to criminal acts). Also, short of leaving the real estate market,
many landlords are likely to "overprotect" since it is difficult to set clear guidelines for
liability given current negligence standards. This is an inefficient use of resources as the
amount spent on protection (and passed on to consumers) will not reduce enough acci-
dents to justify its costs. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
227. Of course, landlords who have attempted to delegate security duties to an outside
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exculpatory clauses in leases is one method of allocating risk in a
contractual arrangement. While few courts have specifically ad-
dressed the use of exculpatory clauses respecting criminal acts,"
in general, a commercial tenant may agree to exonerate a landlord
from liability for future acts of negligence, for both property dam-
age and personal injury. 9 Exculpatory clauses in residential leas-
es have often been found to be against public policy, and therefore
invalid, although, their use in the commercial context has not been
as restricted."a There are some limitations on the use of exculpa-
tory clauses in commercial leases. Five states"at impose statutory
restrictions (e.g., New York law invalidates any agreement that
exempts a lessor from liability for personal injury or property
damage resulting from the lessor's negligence in operation or main-
tenance of the property). Additionally, there appears to be a con-
sensus that exculpatory clauses cannot insulate landlords from
intentional, wanton, or willful behavior.2 Some courts have
found that exculpatory clauses only protect landlords from passive
negligence, not active negligenceY3 A few courts have held that
an exculpatory clause cannot release a landlord who has violated a
statutory provision." Further, an exculpatory clause is usually
binding only on parties to the lease. Third-parties like the tenants'
employees or invitees are not precluded from bringing suit against
the landlord in this instance, although the existence of these types
of provisions may provide for the landlord's later indemnity claim
against the tenant.as Finally, a court may always choose to inval-
idate an exculpatory clause as unconscionable if there is evidence
of grossly unequal bargaining power." In summary, exculpatory
firm are attempting to shift risk as well, but will likely be less successful. See supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
228. See Haines, supra note 34, at 346.
229. See William K. Jones, Private Revision of Public Standards: Exculpatory Agree-
ments in Leases, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 717, 727-28 (1988).
230. "[Clourts have distinguished between residential and commercial leases, ruling that
exculpatory clauses in most residential leases will be voided as against public policy."
Daniel G. Hise, Landlord and Tenant-Exculpatory Clause in Lease Void as Against Pub-
lic Policy-Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982), 3 MIss. C. L. REV. 253,
258 (1983). But see College Mobile Home Park and Sales, Inc. v. Hoffman, 241 N.W.2d
174, 177 (Wis. 1976) (arguing that the categorical distinction between residential and com-
mercial leases is "artificial and arbitrary" in this context).
231. See Jones, supra 229, at 729 (discussing statutes in New York, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Maryland, and Georgia).
232. See Jones, supra note 229, at 730.
233. See, e.g., Vermes v. American Dist. Telegraph Co., 251 N.W.2d 101 (Minn. 1977)
(holding that failure to advise tenant of qualities of jewelry store that might be undesir-
able was "active" negligence that could not be relieved by broad exculpatory clause in
lease).
234. See Hise, supra note 230, at 256; Jones, supra note 229, at 728-32.
235. See Jones, supra note 229, at 731.
236. See id.; see also Haines, supra note 34, at 347-48 n.159; Hise, supra note 230, at
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clauses in commercial leases have generally been held enforceable
in enough cases to warrant landlords' use of them if confronted
with liability for terrorist acts. In this regard, exculpatory clauses
will likely provide a more efficient mechanism of allocating risks
than the use of negligence standards, at least as to damage suffered
by tenants.
5. Intended Effects
In the midst of this analysis of the negative effects, the poten-
tial for positive, intended effects should not be forgotten. If one of
society's primary concerns is to ensure that victims are compensat-
ed fully, society may consider certain market or macroeconomic
effects to be secondary. In other words, the weight given to the
value of private victim compensation may be so high that market
inefficiencies are minor in comparison. If so, the cost of terrorist
prevention may often be "cheapest" to the landowner. 7 As with
victim compensation, perhaps the danger is so grave that society
considers the prevention of terrorism by all reasonable methods,
not just strictly cost-effective ones, desirable. Further, there is
evidently some relationship between opportunity and certain types
of crimes, as well as the magnitude of harm and security measures,
so that often the landlord is not entirely blameless.Y Finally, the
"political" benefit of imposing liability may be that pressure for
legislative reform is eventually brought to bear by more influential
landlords disgusted or threatened by current litigation practices, 9
258.
237. For example, the following analysis as to criminal acts was presented in Craig v.
A.A.R. Realty Corp., 576 A.2d 688 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989):
Of all the involved parties, the cost of crime reduction is cheapest to the land-
owner. For the criminal, imposing civil liability on him in addition to existing
criminal sanctions does not deter him from committing the crime. Imposing
duty on the patron, so that he must protect and compensate himself, may result
in crime reduction, but only at the expensive cost of the patron staying
home. . . . While the patron holds just one expensive [to society] option, stay-
ing home, the landowner holds many options . . . [such as] installation of
better lighting, fences, or guard service ...
Id. at 693. Concerning terrorism, the issuance of warnings may be an example of where
costs are clearly lowest to the landowner.
238. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 250. And in some cases, of course, it may be clear
that the landlord acted irresponsibly. For example, it may be possible to set the negli-
gence standard high enough (e.g., actual notice for duty) that a true fault-based liability
standard is approximated.
239. Under a "political effects model," a new rule imposes liability on a well-represent-
ed group, which is expected to activate legislative attention to the problem, so that in the
long run, the legislature will provide a solution and make the determination of who
should bear accident costs and how. See Zacharias, supra note 205, at 725. While Zacha-
rias argues that his model would work in the context of landlord liability for criminal
acts, he might reject the imposition of liability on landlords for acts of terrorism for the
same reasons he rejects liability for hijacking airlines. See id. at 750.
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F. Summary
Landlord liability for criminal acts has not resulted in clear
guidelines about when duty will be imposed or what security re-
sponses will be considered sufficient. These problems, which miti-
gate attempts at increased prevention and protection, would only be
exacerbated by the application of this doctrine to acts of domestic
terrorism. Our goals as a society are crime/terrorism prevention and
victim compensation, but landlord liability seems equitable only as
a prevention technique, not as a compensation mechanism. Expan-
sive theories of liability, which have as their primary goals giving
compensation to victims, while certainly desirable, are best run by
the government with funds raised from society as a whole. Any
rules placing burdens on landowners should therefore have preven-
tion, rather than compensation, as their primary goal. This conclu-
sion suggests that narrower theories of liability, designed only to
induce landowners to take cost-effective measures to prevent terror-
ism,2" should be implemented.
Theoretically, cost-effective levels of protection could be de-
rived empirically-for example, some types of structural changes
must be more effective than others in certain settings. Under the
current state of the law, however, an efficient standard is not likely
to emerge.24" ' In fashioning a legal response to terrorism, perhaps
other systems that have been forced to address the problem more
extensively will provide direction toward a comprehensive solution.
III. ALTERNATIVE LEGAL RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM
The primary conclusion offered by this Note is that using cur-
rent legal theories of landlord liability for criminal acts as a meth-
od of recovery by victims of domestic terrorism is not the best
legal response, given goals of increased prevention and victim
compensation. Courts deciding this issue will likely be confronted
by societal pressures both to expand and contract the scope of
landowners' duties.242 Their decisions may be affected by the
availability of other alternatives able to adequately address concerns
about victim compensation and prevention. The alternatives
presented here are only intended to be a basis for consid-
eration and not definitive proposals. Discussion is limited
to how these types of representative alternatives can, either
240. See generally Kaufman, supra note 15, at 103-08.
241. "To effectively guide primary behavior ... legal rules must inform people of
liabilities that will be imposed for particular behavior. To do that they must be clear, they
must refer to verifiable facts and they must not call for unachievable behavior." Adler,
supra note 50, at 920.
242. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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separately or in combination, achieve the goals and address
the problems presented.
A. Comprehensive Federal Legislation
Even though victim compensation seems to be a task best
handled by government entities rather than private individuals, in
this context current legislation would not appear to adequately
redress the injuries of non-government affiliated victims of terrorist
acts.243 Therefore, perhaps the most equitable and efficient solu-
tion to the victim compensation issue is to amend current legisla-
tion to provide for a comprehensive platform of victim compensa-
tion for acts of domestic terrorism. Further, the use of legislation
to establish minimum levels of reasonable care has apparently
proven to be effective in the residential context." Federal legisla-
tion specifying minimal structural and procedural antiterrorism
measures for commercial buildings over certain sizes could be
implemented, much as in the residential context, as the basis for
public sanctions or as a guideline in the application of tort liabili-
ty.24 A statutory violation would arguably be conclusive of liabil-
ity-replacing foreseeability-resulting in greater predictability and
lowered use of judicial resources.2" Alternatively, federal legis-
lation could provide direct compensation to landowners. For exam-
ple, landowners in Northern Ireland are compensated directly by
the British government for losses from terrorist attacks. Police
certification that the injury was related to a terrorist attack is re-
quired for reimbursement, but no premiums are paid. Funding co-
mes from tax revenues throughout Great Britain.247 Claims in
Northern Ireland are relatively small when compared with the two
incidents referred to throughout this Note.2" Further, under this
system there does not appear to be any incentive for landowners to
take preventive measures. For these reasons (potential size of losses
and lack of incentives), the Northern Ireland legislative response
does not seem appropriate for adoption in the United States.
243. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Haines, supra note 34, at 353-54 (arguing that courts may not provide
the most appropriate forum for determining the type of protection to which tenants should
be legally entitled, and that legislatures should act to place duty on landlords to use rea-
sonable care, which should be specifically defined at a minimum level).
246. And providing a consistent national benchmark for establishing duty.
247. See Bice, supra note 181, at 463-64.
248. All losses in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1993 totaled £695 million. See id.
at 464.
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B. Government Assisted Insurance
It is pragmatic to assume that if domestic terrorism continues,
United States insurance companies will follow the lead of their
European counterparts and begin to write terrorism exclusions into
commercial property policies. When continental and British insurers
took this course in 1993, fears of an economic crisis prompted the
British government to promise that it would ensure that coverage
for terrorist acts would be available to landowners in Great Brit-
ain.249 The British government essentially agreed to become the
"reinsurer of last resort" for losses caused by terrorist act ° To
do so it formed "Pool Re," a mutual reinsurance company, to pro-
vide the coverage excluded by private insurers.l The British sys-
tem provides five layers of terrorism coverage to a landowner, with
the government having final responsibility if all layers are exhaust-
ed."s2 Premiums charged for the additional Pool Re coverage are
determined based on a number of different factors, some of which
are apparently particular to the "terrorism insurance" market."
Another part of the premium structure is that an "IRA levy" is
attached by the British government to all household and vehicle
policies written, to shift the cost of insurance from London to
other parts of the country. 4 While it does spread risks, there are
problems with the British reinsurance scheme. There seems to be
no incentive for insureds to take preventative measures. Certainly,
premium reductions are common in other contexts, and as was
249. See id. at 447-48 (listing potential economic consequences of the lack of coverage
for terrorism losses including: widespread business bankruptcies; bank lending bases se-
cured by property becoming suspect; property developers becoming unable to secure fi-
nancing; and pension funds becoming unable to rely on income from property invest-
ments). The British government was also pressured to step in by the Association of Brit-
ish Insurers, who argued that "terrorism is a political problem and that the government
should therefore bear the losses." Id. at 448 n.36.
250. Reinsurance is "the insurance by an insurer of the liability of another insurer aris-
ing under contracts of insurance which the latter has entered into"--practically meaning
that "reinsurers insure direct insurers for a pre-determined part of their liability." Id. at
442-43.
251. See id. at 441.
252. The layers are (1) a primary layer of regular property coverage with a
policyholder's direct insurer; (2) if that is exhausted, an additional layer of up to
£100,000, also with direct insurers; (3) and (4) two layers provided directly through Pool
Re, if premiums paid to Pool Re are exhausted (third), member insurers in the pool con-
tribute an additional 10% (fourth); and (5) if all these are exhausted, the British govern-
ment is ultimately is liable for all excess losses. See generally Bice, supra note 181, at
449-54. Pool Re has approximately 115 insurance companies and 120 Lloyd's syndicates
as members who "cede" premiums to the pool to reinsure risks of terrorism. See id. at
450.
253. For example, "target risk" is determined by rate setting personnel based on whether
and to what extent a particular property is at risk of terrorist attack. See id. at 452.
254. See id.
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discussed earlier, there are measures landlords can take to mitigate
the effects of, if not prevent, terrorism."
In a somewhat similar vein, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation ("OPIC") was formed by the United States government
at least partly to "underwrite political risk insurance in friendly,
less developed countries." 6 If political risk was defined to in-
clude terrorism, the principles of OPIC could theoretically be ap-
plied in developing a model for government provided domestic
terrorism insurance, whereby the United States government could
act as either a direct or indirect insurer for terrorism risks. The
lessons learned from the shortcomings of the British system, like
ensuring that premiums reflect preventive measures and using lev-
ies to spread the cost of premiums throughout the country, could
be integrated. When insurance is used in this manner, economic
efficiency is aided because insurance companies, in setting premi-
ums reflective of precautions taken, will help minimize the cost of
accident prevention. Landlords will have a clearer standard to fol-
low; mitigating tendencies to either overprotect or do nothing. In
this manner, the costs of victim compensation can be at least par-
tially borne by the party best able to spread the risk-the govern-
ment-in an economically efficient manner that also provides in-
centives for landlords to take measures to help prevent, or lessen
the effect of, terrorist attacks.
C. Contract Theories
Once society is assured that victims of domestic terrorism will
be fully compensated, via comprehensive legislation and govern-
ment assisted insurance as suggested above, there are strong philo-
sophical arguments for letting the market function via contract
liability alone. 7 Market or contract based theories partially de-
pend on the premise that it is the government's, and not the pri-
vate sector's, duty to protect citizens. Further, even if there is a
private sector duty, it is not fair to single out landlords." Some
255. See id. at 459, 461-62.
256. Id. at 466. In general, OPIC offers programs to insure United States investments in
developing countries against currency inconvertibility and expropriation, as well as political
violence. Most forms of long-term investment (equity, debt, loan guarantees, and leases)
may be insured.
257. The choice between tort and contract law is perhaps philosophical. A contract view
would suggest that tort law should act only when there is no possibility to contract (and
even then the outcome should mirror what the parties would have done), while a tort
view would suggest that tort law should control when society has decided that it (and not
the parties themselves) should set the applicable standards. See Thomas C. Galligan Jr.,
Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457, 461-
62 (1994). Whatever the philosophical view, the landlord-tenant relationship is predicated,
before all else, on a contract.
258. "The fact that government and law enforcement authorities cannot prevent criminal
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theories provide that whatever security measures are necessary will
be implemented by landowners on their own because customers
will demand them. "By letting the market police itself ... the
more efficient level of protection will emerge as business owners
seek to attract customers by using the most cost effective mea-
sures."
' 59
Advantages to traditional contract liability include the ability to
potentially cure a dangerous situation before a terrorist act occurs
via traditional contract remedies like rent abatement, repair and
offset, rescission, or even termination of the lease if contracted
security measures are not provided.' ° In the commercial context,
the uses of exculpatory clauses and indemnification provisions
result in a more efficient allocation of risks than the legal rules
now in effect, at least when tenants are the victims."' They result
in greater precision in the negotiated solution, as each party's re-
sponsibilities are defined, and the bearer of the risk is clearly iden-
tified. This in turn allows procurement of appropriate insurance, as
well as preventive security measures by the party bearing the risk
(avoiding overlap of duties). 62 Provisions regarding risks related
to terrorist acts and the provision of security against them should
therefore be explicitly provided for in every commercial tenant's
lease and pursuing a contract remedy should always be considered
an appropriate legal response where applicable.
D. Tort Reform
When contract claims are not available, and if recommendations
regarding victim compensation are not implemented, the problems
with the negligence theories of landlord liability for criminal acts
can be lessened so that they can be considered appropriate legal
responses in that limited context. In those instances, since victim
compensation is not assured, equity demands that landlord liability
not be rejected. To mitigate the primary problems involved in the
negligence formulations discussed above, foreseeability should be
treated as a question of law and reserved for the court. The courts
attacks does not justify transferring such responsibility to business proprietors." Kaufman,
supra note 15, at 109 n.90 (quoting Fager, Liability of Business Proprietors for Criminal
Acts of Third Persons, 29 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 29, 33 (1978)); see also Sharp, supra
note 23, at 17.
259. Kaufman, supra note 15, at 110.
260. See Haines, supra note 34, at 323; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
261. Exculpatory clauses will generally not preclude suits in tort by plaintiffs who are
not parties to the lease. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. If actions for victims
of domestic terrorism were restricted to those based on contract, the victim compensation
legislation suggested here would be expected to provide exclusive recovery for those vic-
tims precluded from tort suits.
262. See Jones, supra note 229, at 733.
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should then promulgate clear standards of liability and appropriate
responsive security measures with an eye toward uniformity among
jurisdictions. And finally, the courts should be responsive to con-
cers about landlords as social insurers, landlords operating in the
commercial context, and the limited ability of landlords to prevent
terrorism, by restricting the definition of duty.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City
bombings, America is learning how to deal with domestic terrorism
by "hardening" our buildings and stepping-up security. We have
not yet, however, developed methods for providing equitable and
efficient legal remedies for victims of domestic terrorism. Since
statutory victim compensation provisions in place will likely not
provide full relief, victims are apt to pursue civil litigation against
the one party likely to have sufficient, available assets-the land-
owner. Victims will likely proceed, and in fact have proceeded in
the World Trade Center bombing case, under the theory that land-
lords have a duty to protect tenants from criminal acts of third
parties. However, the body of law in this area is unsettled. Land-
owners are generally unable to predict liability or develop appropri-
ate responses once liability is imposed. Liability varies from juris-
diction to jurisdiction and indeed even from court to court. Many
of the problems with landlord liability in this area have resulted
from courts' treatment of the concept of foreseeability as establish-
ing duty. In applying this theory of liability to terrorist acts, the
issue of foreseeability is stretched to its outer limit; all of its short-
comings are accentuated. Further, courts will be asked to develop
standards for terrorism liability in an environment of conflicting
pressures; to both restrict duty, in the face of growing concern that
landlords should not be social insurers, and to expand duty, in the
face of the increasing visibility of terrorist acts.
While it is not clear how courts will define liability in view of
these pressures, it seems certain that imposing tort liability on
landlords for terrorist acts is not the most appropriate legal re-
sponse. Victim compensation is best handled by the ultimate risk-
spreader, the government. To the extent society's concerns involve
victim compensation and risk spreading, comprehensive federal
legislation and government assisted insurance should be the primary
remedies. To the extent society's concerns involve prevention, or
antiterrorist measures, perhaps government is again the most effi-
cient actor. Still, landlords can often effectively contribute through
structural and procedural changes in security designed to aid both
in the prevention and mitigation of damage. Sufficient incentives
for this role can likely be achieved by making premiums under a
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government assisted insurance program contingent on attaining
certain specifically defined safety levels, establishing statutory
minimums for security measures based on building types, and
allowing the market to function via contractual risk shifting provi-
sions, such as exculpatory clauses. Limited tort liability (i.e., with
clear, uniform standards of duty and sufficient responses) should
only be used as a safety net when necessary to prevent inequity.
How our society responds to domestic terrorism will necessarily be
indicative of our opinions about the current state of the American
legal system. To achieve society's goals of both victim compensa-
tion and prevention, we must forge equitable yet efficient legal
responses from the stockpile of alternatives at our disposal.
MELINDA L. REYNOLDS
